War Balance
NATO: each member's money toward Ukraine or Russia since 2022
Support for Ukraine from NATO's 32 members, 2022 to August 2026: €320bn, 0.66% of their combined GDP. With trade with Russia and frozen Russian money counted, the net is 1.3% of GDP toward Ukraine. For their size, the table starts with Lithuania, Estonia and Finland.
These numbers measure money: aid to Ukraine and the change in what Russia keeps from trade, against a world without the war. Weapons count at their money value: aid at market value when delivered, weapons and troops sent to Russia at the seller's gain where Russia paid and in full where it did not. Votes, diplomacy and intent are not in them.
Totals: the 32 members' best estimates added up, and as a share of their combined GDP. Each member's range and chance are on its row.
Members · 32
Sorted by “Net” as a share of one year's GDP, from the Ukraine side to the Russia side, 2022 to August 2026. + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia; + adds to its support for Ukraine, − takes from it; more or less: how much more or less Russia kept (taxes and profit, not sales) than in a world without the war.
| # | Country | Net | Support for Ukraine | Russia kept from trade, vs no war | Russian money frozen (return lost) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Lithuania | +11.9%+€8.8bn · +€3,036 per personlikely 6.8% to 18.2% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€1.3bn+1.8% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €7.4bn less10.1% of GDP lessvery likely · >99% | €76m0.10% of GDP |
| 2 | Estonia | +10.8%+€4.1bn · +€2,993 per personlikely 5.3% to 17.4% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€0.92bn+2.4% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €3.1bn less8.2% of GDP lessvery likely · 99% | €47m0.12% of GDP |
| 3 | Finland | +8.5%+€23.1bn · +€4,108 per personlikely 5.4% to 12.6% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€5.3bn+1.9% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €17.4bn less6.4% of GDP lessvery likely · >99% | €0.40bn0.15% of GDP |
| 4 | Latvia | +5.6%+€2.2bn · +€1,165 per personlikely 3.2% to 8.7% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€0.75bn+1.9% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €1.4bn less3.5% of GDP lessvery likely · 99% | €49m0.13% of GDP |
| 5 | Netherlands | +5.1%+€54.1bn · +€3,006 per personlikely 3.0% to 8.2% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€22.8bn+2.2% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €30.2bn less2.9% of GDP lessvery likely · 98% | €1.1bn0.10% of GDP |
| 6 | Poland | +5.0%+€37.8bn · +€1,034 per personlikely 2.8% to 7.8% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€14.2bn+1.9% of GDPvery likely · 98% | €22.8bn less3.0% of GDP lessvery likely · >99% | €0.85bn0.11% of GDP |
| 7 | Denmark | +4.0%+€15.5bn · +€2,586 per personlikely 3.3% to 5.0% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€11.2bn+2.9% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €3.7bn less0.98% of GDP lessvery likely · >99% | €0.49bn0.13% of GDP |
| 8 | Sweden | +3.7%+€20.1bn · +€1,903 per personlikely 2.9% to 4.7% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€8.8bn+1.6% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €10.6bn less1.9% of GDP lessvery likely · >99% | €0.71bn0.13% of GDP |
| 9 | Germany | +3.7%+€153bn · +€1,828 per personlikely 2.6% to 5.0% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€74.8bn+1.8% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €72.6bn less1.7% of GDP lessvery likely · >99% | €5.3bn0.13% of GDP |
| 10 | Luxembourg | +3.5%+€2.9bn · +€4,228 per personlikely 2.2% to 5.6% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€0.77bn+0.94% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €0.70bn less0.86% of GDP lessvery likely · >99% | €1.4bn1.7% of GDP |
| 11 | Belgium | +3.4%+€20.3bn · +€1,708 per personlikely 2.2% to 4.7% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€5.8bn+0.97% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €3.7bn less0.62% of GDP lesslikely toward Ukraine · 79% | €10.8bn1.8% of GDP |
| 12 | Bulgaria | +3.3%+€3.1bn · +€488 per personlikely from <0.01% toward Russia to 7.3% toward Ukrainelikely toward Ukraine · 95% | +€0.68bn+0.72% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €2.4bn less2.5% of GDP lesslikely toward Ukraine · 87% | €100m0.10% of GDP |
| 13 | Norway | +2.9%+€14.8bn · +€2,665 per personlikely 2.4% to 3.7% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€12.8bn+2.5% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €2bn less0.40% of GDP lessvery likely · 98% | – |
| 14 | Romania | +2.8%+€8.9bn · +€466 per personlikely 0.99% to 4.6% toward Ukrainevery likely · 99% | +€1.8bn+0.58% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €6.7bn less2.1% of GDP lessvery likely · 96% | €0.35bn0.11% of GDP |
| 15 | Czechia | +2.6%+€8bn · +€737 per personlikely 0.48% to 5.7% toward Ukrainevery likely · 97% | +€4.1bn+1.3% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €3.6bn less1.2% of GDP lesslikely toward Ukraine · 81% | €0.30bn0.10% of GDP |
| 16 | United Kingdom | +1.8%+€58.4bn · +€843 per personlikely 1.3% to 2.4% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€18.4bn+0.58% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €34.9bn less1.1% of GDP lessvery likely · >99% | €5bn0.16% of GDP |
| 17 | Italy | +1.6%+€34.4bn · +€584 per personlikely 0.60% to 2.8% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€12.7bn+0.60% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €18.8bn less0.89% of GDP lesslikely toward Ukraine · 91% | €3bn0.14% of GDP |
| 18 | France | +1.6%+€43.6bn · +€636 per personlikely 0.80% to 2.3% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€16.9bn+0.60% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €20.2bn less0.72% of GDP lesslikely toward Ukraine · 94% | €6.5bn0.23% of GDP |
| 19 | Croatia | +1.5%+€1.2bn · +€306 per personlikely 0.69% to 3.9% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€0.66bn+0.85% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €0.44bn less0.56% of GDP lesslikely toward Ukraine · 85% | €87m0.11% of GDP |
| 20 | Portugal | +1.3%+€3.5bn · +€325 per personlikely 0.78% to 1.9% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€1.3bn+0.49% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €1.8bn less0.68% of GDP lessvery likely · 98% | €0.34bn0.13% of GDP |
| 21 | Iceland | +1.2%+€0.35bn · +€901 per personlikely 0.56% to 3.1% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€0.27bn+0.91% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €83m less0.28% of GDP lesslikely toward Ukraine · 88% | – |
| 22 | Spain | +1.1%+€16.6bn · +€339 per personlikely 0.58% to 1.7% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€8.4bn+0.56% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €6.2bn less0.42% of GDP lesslikely toward Ukraine · 89% | €2bn0.13% of GDP |
| 23 | Slovenia | +0.66%+€0.42bn · +€196 per personlikely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukrainelikely toward Ukraine · 88% | +€0.49bn+0.78% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €0.15bn more0.25% of GDP moretoo close to call · 58% toward Russia | €79m0.13% of GDP |
| 24 | Canada | +0.51%+€10.6bn · +€258 per personlikely 0.38% to 0.78% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€8.8bn+0.42% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €1.7bn less0.08% of GDP lessvery likely · 98% | €95m<0.01% of GDP |
| 25 | United States | +0.51%+€132bn · +€387 per personlikely 0.40% to 0.64% toward Ukrainevery likely · >99% | +€82.6bn+0.32% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €47.4bn less0.18% of GDP lessvery likely · >99% | €1.6bn<0.01% of GDP |
| 26 | Montenegro | +0.37%+€25m · +€40 per personlikely from 0.21% toward Russia to 2.0% toward Ukrainelikely toward Ukraine · 91% | +€24m+0.34% of GDPvery likely · 97% | €2m less0.02% of GDP lessessentially zero | – |
| 27 | Slovakia | +0.24%+€0.29bn · +€54 per personlikely from 4.0% toward Russia to 4.8% toward Ukrainetoo close to call · 58% toward Ukraine | +€1.1bn+0.89% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €0.91bn more0.75% of GDP moretoo close to call · 58% toward Russia | €0.13bn0.11% of GDP |
| 28 | Greece | +0.08%+€0.18bn · +€17 per personlikely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraineessentially zero | +€1.4bn+0.65% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €1.6bn more0.70% of GDP morelikely toward Russia · 69% | €0.29bn0.13% of GDP |
| 29 | Albania | +0.07%+€16m · +€7 per personlikely from 0.53% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraineessentially zero | +€20m+0.09% of GDPessentially zero | €4m more0.02% of GDP moreessentially zero | – |
| 30 | North Macedonia | −2.1%−€0.30bn · −€163 per personlikely from 4.1% toward Russia to 0.87% toward Ukrainelikely toward Russia · 87% | +€61m+0.42% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €0.36bn more2.5% of GDP morelikely toward Russia · 91% | – |
| 31 | Türkiye | −3.1%−€32.7bn · −€382 per personlikely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russiavery likely · 96% | +€0.16bn+0.02% of GDPessentially zero | €32.8bn more3.1% of GDP morevery likely · 96% | – |
| 32 | Hungary | −6.0%−€11.4bn · −€1,192 per personlikely 0.72% to 9.8% toward Russiavery likely · 97% | +€0.68bn+0.36% of GDPvery likely · >99% | €12.3bn more6.4% of GDP morevery likely · 98% | €0.20bn0.10% of GDP |
Each row: the best estimate, then its range and the chance of its direction, as in the country's panel.
Questions
Which NATO countries help Ukraine the most?
For their size, on the net, the table starts with Lithuania, Estonia and Finland. 23 of the 32 members are very likely toward Ukraine.
Are any NATO members toward Russia?
On the net, very likely toward Russia: Türkiye and Hungary. Direction likely, too close to call or near zero: Bulgaria, Slovenia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Greece, Albania and North Macedonia. Each row gives support and trade separately, with the chance of each direction.
Related
Ranking · Support for Ukraine by country · Trade with Russia by country · All topics · How it works
УкраїнськаDeutschFrançaisPolskiNederlandsEspañol
Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/group/nato/