Spain's support for Ukraine since 2022: €8.4bn (0.56% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €6.2bn (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €2bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 1.1% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.58% to 1.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.1% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.56%
€8.4bn
likely 0.44% to 0.79% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.42%
€6.2bn
likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.97% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 89%
Russia kept €6.2bn (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.37% of GDP less (€5.6bn; likely from 0.14% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine)
Spain's own gain from trade with Russia: Spain kept 0.05% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€671m; likely <0.01% to 0.09% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€2.0bn).
Its story in short
Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €8.5bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 81% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 19% went beyond them.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €2.7bn (0.18% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Bought 69% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €5.3bn in 2021, €1.7bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€2.0bn; likely €1.4bn to €2.4bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.56% · €8.4bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.31%
€4.6bn
Hosting refugeesC
+0.12%
€1.7bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.11%
€1.6bn
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€323m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.01%
€175m
Spain kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€68m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€55m
Spain kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€33m
Spain kept part of others' aid, spent hereD
−<0.01%
€7m
Spain kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D
−<0.01%
€6m
Spain kept back part of its aid, spent at homeD
−<0.01%
€5m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.42% · €6.2bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.55%
€8.2bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.18%
€2.7bn
Spain's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.03%
€453m
Spain kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.01%
€201m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+<0.01%
€134m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€105m
Spain kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€48m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€39m
Spain earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€32m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €2.0bn
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.08%
€1.2bn
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.05%
€732m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€4.1bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €2.1bn in 2022 to €1.4bn in 2025.
It bought €5.3bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.7bn in 2025 (−69%). It sold €2.4bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.2bn in 2025 (−50%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 78.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Spain: €2.7bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 70% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Spain's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.38bn
€0.25bnrange €0.19bn to €0.35bn
€0.42bn
A
Oil products
€1.9bn
€1.7bnrange €1.4bn to €2.4bn
€2.1bn
A
Pipeline gas
€0m
€0m
€3m
–
LNG
€11.6bn
€10.5bnrange €7.9bn to €15bn
€12bn
A
Coal
€0.41bn
€0.38bnrange €0.31bn to €0.54bn
€0.39bn
A
Other goods
€2.8bn
€3bn
–
All goods
€17.1bn
€15.9bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 81% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 19% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Spain applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Spain as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Spain. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €2.7bn extra from 2022 (0.18% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €49m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€2.0bn; likely €1.4bn to €2.4bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €1bn (16 December 2022, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
268,650 refugees from Ukraine, 5.5 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1.7bn (0.12% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Spain: €1.9bn spent on refugees, less €169m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €2.6bn; counted here: €1.6bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €7.3bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €3bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €10.4bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €750m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€1.3bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Spain; what its firms kept of it, €0.12bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Spain's companies made less profit in Russia: €0.45bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €0.13bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €241m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €71m to €768m; 0.02% of a year's GDP.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 25 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 21 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 21 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
43 sources back its parts: 15 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 20% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 74% modelled (C) and 6% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Spain's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €8.4bn, 0.56% of one year's GDP (likely 0.44% to 0.79%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Spain still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 78.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.7bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €5.3bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Spain–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2025 (€5.3bn in 2021), and sold €1.2bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €8.4bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +1.1% of one year's GDP (likely 0.58% to 1.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Is Spain helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +1.1% of one year's GDP (likely 0.58% to 1.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €6.2bn (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Spain trade with Russia?
It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2025 (€5.3bn in 2021), and sold €1.2bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €6.2bn (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war.
How much did Spain give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €2.1bn; 2023 €1.9bn; 2024 €1.7bn; 2025 €1.4bn; 2026 (to August) €1.3bn. In total since 2022: €8.4bn (likely 0.44% to 0.79%).
War Balance