War Balance
Is Albania helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Albania's support for Ukraine since 2022: €20m (0.09% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €4m (0.02% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€175m; the other parts take €171m off it). The net is 0.07% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.53% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Ukraine by
0.07% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.53% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine · €16m · ≈ 0.02%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.07% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere.
Chance toward Ukraine: 70%; 90% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.09%
€20m
likely from <0.01% below zero to 0.36% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.02%
€4m
likely from 0.62% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €4m (0.02% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€175m; the other parts take €171m off it).
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.02% of GDP more (€4m; likely from 0.62% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine)
- Albania's own gain from trade with Russia: Albania kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 70%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.53% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.09% · €20m
| Aid: weapons, money, loansD | +0.07% | €16m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.01% | €3m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +0.01% | €2m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.02% · €4m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.84% | €182m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.81% | €175m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.05% | €12m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€89m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€5m | +€24m | +€28m | +0.13% |
| 2023 | +€10m | −€99m | −€89m | −0.28% |
| 2024 | +€2m | +€16m | +€17m | −0.20% |
| 2025 | +€3m | +€23m | +€25m | −0.09% |
| 2026* | +€1m | +€33m | +€34m | +0.07% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
Albania's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | €15mnot in Kiel's tracker |
| Refugee hosting | €2m |
| Private donations and purchases | €3m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €20m |
Quality of the split: D
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €0.11bn from Russia in 2021 and €23m in 2025 (−80%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. For Albania: €12m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. Albania is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists Albania as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Albania. Checked 27 October 2026.
Sources
- HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)
- Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)
- Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)
- ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'
The cost of switching away from Russian energy
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €36m extra from 2022 (0.17% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Refugees from Ukraine
4,571 refugees from Ukraine, 1.9 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €2m (0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Albania: €3m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€36m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Albania; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.17bn (0.81% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
Neighbours by land
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Kosovo | +1.1%+€0.11bnlikely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| Montenegro | +0.37%+€25mlikely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| Greece | +0.08%+€0.18bnessentially zero |
| Albania | +0.07%+€16messentially zero |
| North Macedonia | −2.1%−€0.30bnlikely toward Russia · 87% |
How the number is backed
17 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 51% modelled (C) and 49% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Sources, by part
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Aid: weapons, money, loans D
Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Ukraine kept more from extra sales here C
Every source of its parts (17)
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- official Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
- method input Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)
- method input Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute
- own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates
- official Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets
- official Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending
- official Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost
Questions
How much has Albania given to Ukraine?
Albania's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €20m, 0.09% of one year's GDP (likely from <0.01% below zero to 0.36% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Why is Albania's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: +0.07% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.53% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries.
Is Albania helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.07% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.53% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 70%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €4m (0.02% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€175m; the other parts take €171m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How does Albania compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Kosovo +1.1%, Montenegro +0.37%, Greece +0.08%, Albania +0.07%, North Macedonia −2.1%.
Where do the numbers for Albania come from?
17 sources back its parts, 5 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Aid: weapons, money, loans: Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
How many Ukrainian refugees does Albania host, and what does it cost?
4,571 refugees from Ukraine, 1.9 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €2m (0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Albania: €3m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Does Albania have sanctions on Russia?
Yes. Albania is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists Albania as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Albania. Sources: HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads); Council of the EU, same statement (original URL).
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Thailand+0.08%Essentially zero · +€393m · 68%
- Greece+0.08%Essentially zero · +€175m · 53%
- Peru+0.07%Essentially zero · +€187m · 80%
- Albania+0.07%Essentially zero · +€16m · 70%
- Timor-Leste+0.07%Essentially zero · +€1m · >99%
- Trinidad and Tobago+0.06%Essentially zero · +€16m · 71%
- Mali+0.06%Essentially zero · +€14m · 57%
More about Albania
Groups
Its parts, ranked against other countries
Every country, by year
17 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/albania/