Is Greece helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Greece's support for Ukraine since 2022: €1.4bn (0.65% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Greece moved €1.6bn (0.70% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Greece kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.4bn; the other parts take €879m off it)); Russia also lost €0.29bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.08% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine · €175m · ≈ 0.02%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.08% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Ukraine: 53%; 80% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.65%
€1.4bn
likely 0.45% to 1.2% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.70%
€1.6bn
likely from 3.1% toward Russia to 1.9% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 69%
Greece moved €1.6bn (0.70% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Greece kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.4bn; the other parts take €879m off it)).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.13% of GDP more (€287m; likely from 2.1% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine)
Greece's own gain from trade with Russia: Greece kept 0.57% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1.3bn; likely 0.05% to 2.0% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€288m).
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €2.4bn (1.1% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €687m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 63% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €3.5bn in 2021, €1.3bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€288m; likely €207m to €338m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Ships Russian oil Greece kept €1.5bn (0.68% of GDP) more from shipping and insuring Russian oil.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 53%; 80% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.65% · €1.4bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.31%
€688m
Hosting refugeesD
+0.19%
€417m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.09%
€190m
Undisclosed military aidD
+0.04%
€100m
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€48m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.02%
€39m
Greece kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€22m
Greece kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−<0.01%
€16m
Greece kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€14m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€12m
Greece kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C
−<0.01%
€3m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.70% · €1.6bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.5%
€3.4bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−1.1%
€2.4bn
Greece kept more from shipping Russian oilB
−0.68%
€1.5bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.56%
€1.2bn
Greece's companies made less profit in RussiaD
+0.07%
€160m
Greece kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.03%
€77m
Greece kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€18m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€17m
Its firms paid Russia more taxC
−<0.01%
€5m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €288m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.08%
€185m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.05%
€102m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€3bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.42bn in 2022 to €0.24bn in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €3.5bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.3bn in 2025 (−63%). It sold €0.22bn to Russia in 2021 and €95m in 2025 (−56%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 85.1% of what it bought from Russia. For Greece: €2.4bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 82% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Greece's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.23bn
€14mrange €0m to €70m
€0.42bn
A
Oil products
€4.8bn
€4.4bnrange €4bn to €5bn
€5.7bn
A
Pipeline gas
€3.4bn
€3.2bnrange €3bn to €3.6bn
€0.79bn
A
LNG
€0.55bn
€0.52bnrange €0.48bn to €0.58bn
€0.60bn
A
Coal
€7m
€7mrange €6m to €8m
€3m
A
Other goods
€1.6bn
€6.4bn
–
All goods
€10.6bn
€14.6bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Yes. As an EU member, Greece applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Greece as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Greece. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €2.6bn extra from 2022 (1.2% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.69bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€288m; likely €207m to €338m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Refugees from Ukraine
41,755 refugees from Ukraine, 4.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.42bn (0.19% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Greece: €449m spent on refugees, less €32m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €169m; counted here: €190m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount. Loans, full amount: €0.99bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.44bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €1.2bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €107m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€2.8bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Greece; what its firms kept of it, €55m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Greece's companies made less profit in Russia: €0.16bn (0.07% of one year's GDP). Russia took €124m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €50m to €298m; 0.06% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Greece kept more from shipping Russian oil: €1.5bn (0.68% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1.2bn (0.56% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
45 sources back its parts: 14 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 22% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 58% modelled (C) and 19% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Greece's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €1.4bn, 0.65% of one year's GDP (likely 0.45% to 1.2%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Greece trade with Russia?
It bought €1.3bn from Russia in 2025 (€3.5bn in 2021), and sold €95m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Greece moved €1.6bn (0.70% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Greece kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.4bn; the other parts take €879m off it)).
Does Greece still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 85.1% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.3bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €3.5bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Does Greece help Russia get around sanctions?
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers.
Is Greece helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.08% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 53%; 80% of the other method choices agree. Greece moved €1.6bn (0.70% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Greece kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.4bn; the other parts take €879m off it)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How much Russian money is frozen in Greece?
Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€288m; likely €207m to €338m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only. No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
War Balance