Czechia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €4.1bn (1.3% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3.6bn (1.2% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €0.30bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 2.6% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.48% to 5.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · 97%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 2.6% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.
Chance toward Ukraine: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
1.3%
€4.1bn
likely 0.88% to 1.9% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
1.2%
€3.6bn
likely from 0.90% toward Russia to 4.2% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 81%
Russia kept €3.6bn (1.2% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.1% of GDP less (€3.4bn; likely from 0.96% toward Russia to 4.1% toward Ukraine)
Czechia's own gain from trade with Russia: Czechia kept 0.07% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€220m; likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.18% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% of GDP in returns (€304m).
Its story in short
Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €7.5bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 29% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 71% went beyond them.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €5.1bn (1.7% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €520m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 83% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €5.6bn in 2021, €951m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 74% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €3.9bn in 2021, €1.0bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 1.3% · €4.1bn
Hosting refugeesB3 official sources
+1.0%
€3.1bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.18%
€571m
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.11%
€344m
Private donationsD
+0.07%
€224m
Czechia kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−0.05%
€166m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.04%
€123m
Czechia kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereC
−0.02%
€50m
Czechia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€18m
Czechia kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€17m
Czechia kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€14m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€11m
Czechia kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC
−<0.01%
€6m
Czechia kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C
−<0.01%
€2m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.2% · €3.6bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+2.4%
€7.4bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−1.7%
€5.1bn
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.32%
€976m
Czechia's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.05%
€146m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+0.04%
€112m
Czechia kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.02%
€72m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.01%
€43m
Czechia kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€26m
Czechia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€23m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% in returns · €304m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.06%
€196m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€108m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€2.7bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €1.5bn in 2022 to €0.69bn in 2025. The yearly net amount changed side: 2022 −€1.4bn, 2023 +€2.3bn, 2024 +€2bn, 2025 +€2.7bn, 2026* +€2.5bn.
It bought €5.6bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.95bn in 2025 (−83%). It sold €3.9bn to Russia in 2021 and €1bn in 2025 (−74%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 72.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Czechia: €5.1bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 99% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Czechia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€5.9bn
€5.1bnrange €4.1bn to €6.1bn
€5.9bn
A
Pipeline gas
€7.8bn
€7.7bnrange €6.1bn to €9.4bn
€3.5bn
A
Coal
€7m
€7mrange €5m to €9m
€7m
A
Other goods
€4bn
€3.9bn
–
All goods
€17.7bn
€16.8bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 29% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 71% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Czechia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Czechia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Czechia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €3bn extra from 2022 (0.98% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.52bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.10% of a year's GDP (€304m; likely €219m to €357m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €0.35bn (2023, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
397,645 refugees from Ukraine, 36 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €3.1bn (1.0% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Czechia: €3.3bn spent on refugees, less €213m, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €1,847 per refugee per year (1,696,527 refugee-years).
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €638m; counted here: €344m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €0.87bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.31bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €1.6bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €259m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€9.9bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Czechia; what its firms kept of it, €0.27bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Czechia's companies made less profit in Russia: €0.15bn (0.05% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €0.11bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russia took €149m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €43m to €474m; 0.05% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.98bn (0.32% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €109m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €102m to €356m); €410m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 16 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 14 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 14 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
44 sources back its parts: 15 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 20% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 73% modelled (C) and 8% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported national budget figures
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Czechia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €4.1bn, 1.3% of one year's GDP (likely 0.88% to 1.9%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Czechia trade with Russia?
It bought €0.95bn from Russia in 2025 (€5.6bn in 2021), and sold €1bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €3.6bn (1.2% of GDP) less than without the war.
Is Czechia helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +2.6% of one year's GDP (likely 0.48% to 5.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · 97%). Chance toward Ukraine: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3.6bn (1.2% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Czechia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €0.95bn from Russia in 2025 (€5.6bn in 2021), and sold €1bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €4.1bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +2.6% of one year's GDP (likely 0.48% to 5.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · 97%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Czechia still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 72.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.95bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €5.6bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
How many Ukrainian refugees does Czechia host, and what does it cost?
397,645 refugees from Ukraine, 36 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €3.1bn (1.0% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Czechia: €3.3bn spent on refugees, less €213m, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €1,847 per refugee per year (1,696,527 refugee-years).
War Balance