Poland's support for Ukraine since 2022: €14.2bn (1.9% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €22.8bn (3.0% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas and oil Russia cut off itself (€11.1bn of €22.8bn); Russia also lost €0.85bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 5.0% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 2.8% to 7.8% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 5.0% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Much of what Russia kept less is gas and oil Russia cut off itself.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
1.9%
€14.2bn
likely 0.36% to 3.1% very likely · 98%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
3.0%
€22.8bn
likely 1.4% to 5.5% toward Ukraine very likely · >99%
Russia kept €22.8bn (3.0% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas and oil Russia cut off itself (€11.1bn of €22.8bn).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.9% of GDP less (€21.9bn; likely 1.3% to 5.3% toward Ukraine)
Poland's own gain from trade with Russia: Poland kept 0.12% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€884m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.11% of GDP in returns (€851m).
Its story in short
Gas and oil cut off by Russia Much of what Russia kept less is gas and oil Russia cut off itself. Of which gas and pipeline oil Russia cut off itself, or gas that stopped with the end of transit: €11.1bn
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €1.8bn (0.23% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €1.0bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 92% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €15.3bn in 2021, €1.2bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 64% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €7.9bn in 2021, €2.8bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 1.9% · €14.2bn
Hosting refugeesC
+1.4%
€10.6bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.39%
€3.0bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.27%
€2.0bn
Poland kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−0.12%
€910m
Poland kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−0.11%
€820m
Poland kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−0.06%
€438m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.05%
€411m
Private donationsC
+0.05%
€405m
Poland kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)B
−<0.01%
€68m
Poland kept back part of its aid, spent at homeB
−<0.01%
€23m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€20m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 3.0% · €22.8bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+3.0%
€22.3bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.23%
€1.8bn
Poland kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.11%
€838m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.10%
€777m
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.08%
€593m
Poland earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.01%
€106m
Poland's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.01%
€84m
Poland kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€68m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€42m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.11% in returns · €851m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.07%
€548m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€303m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€8.8bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €5.9bn in 2022 to €1.8bn in 2025.
It bought €15.3bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.2bn in 2025 (−92%). It sold €7.9bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.8bn in 2025 (−64%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 66.0% of what it bought from Russia. For Poland: €1.8bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 58% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Poland's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€6.5bn
€4.3bnrange €3.5bn to €5.1bn
€7.6bn
A
Oil products
€2.9bn
€2.6bnrange €2.1bn to €3bn
€2.5bn
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€2.1bn
€1.9bnrange €1.5bn to €2.3bn
€2.8bn
A
Coal
€0.35bn
€0.31bnrange €0.25bn to €0.36bn
€0.48bn
A
Other goods
€10.9bn
€10.3bn
–
All goods
€22.9bn
€19.4bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: C, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 40% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 48% gas and pipeline oil that Russia cut off itself, or gas that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 13% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Poland applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Poland as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Poland. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €5.5bn extra from 2022 (0.72% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €1bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.11% of a year's GDP (€851m; likely €613m to €998m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €34m (March 2022, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
856,340 refugees from Ukraine, 23 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €10.6bn (1.4% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Poland: €12.5bn spent on refugees, less €1.9bn, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €2,372 per refugee per year (4,468,201 refugee-years).
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €5.9bn; counted here: €3.0bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €3.8bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €1.3bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €4.2bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €599m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€28.7bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Poland; what its firms kept of it, €2.3bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Its firms paid Russia less tax: €0.59bn (0.08% of one year's GDP). Poland's companies made less profit in Russia: €84m (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €260m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €107m to €739m; 0.03% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.78bn (0.10% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €103m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €99m to €342m); €419m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 7 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 6 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 6 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
44 sources back its parts: 15 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 5% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 93% modelled (C) and 3% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported national budget figures
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Poland's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €14.2bn, 1.9% of one year's GDP (likely 0.36% to 3.1%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Poland trade with Russia?
It bought €1.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€15.3bn in 2021), and sold €2.8bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €22.8bn (3.0% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas and oil Russia cut off itself (€11.1bn of €22.8bn).
Does Poland support Russia?
In money terms the net is +5.0% of one year's GDP (likely 2.8% to 7.8% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €22.8bn (3.0% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas and oil Russia cut off itself (€11.1bn of €22.8bn). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Poland–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €1.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€15.3bn in 2021), and sold €2.8bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €14.2bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +5.0% of one year's GDP (likely 2.8% to 7.8% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Poland still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 66.0% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.2bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €15.3bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
How many Ukrainian refugees does Poland host, and what does it cost?
856,340 refugees from Ukraine, 23 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €10.6bn (1.4% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Poland: €12.5bn spent on refugees, less €1.9bn, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €2,372 per refugee per year (4,468,201 refugee-years).
War Balance