Romania's support for Ukraine since 2022: €1.8bn (0.58% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €6.7bn (2.1% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €0.35bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 2.8% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.99% to 4.6% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 2.8% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. What Russia kept less was partly required by sanctions, partly beyond them.
Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.58%
€1.8bn
likely 0.39% to 0.81% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
2.1%
€6.7bn
likely 0.32% to 3.9% toward Ukraine very likely · 96%
Russia kept €6.7bn (2.1% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.1% of GDP less (€6.7bn; likely 0.31% to 3.9% toward Ukraine)
Romania's own gain from trade with Russia: Romania kept 0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€46m; likely <0.01% to 0.05% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.11% of GDP in returns (€349m).
Its story in short
Partly its sanctions, partly beyond them Of the €7.7bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 51% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 49% went beyond them.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €396m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 96% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €3.8bn in 2021, €132m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 76% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.1bn in 2021, €261m in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Hosts many refugees 219,900 refugees from Ukraine, 12 per 1,000 residents.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.58% · €1.8bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.26%
€835m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.13%
€424m
Hosting refugeesD
+0.13%
€423m
Private donationsD
+0.04%
€143m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.04%
€113m
Romania kept more from extra services sold to UkraineB
−0.02%
€52m
Romania kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−0.01%
€35m
Romania kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€10m
Romania kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereC
−<0.01%
€9m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€8m
Romania kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C
−<0.01%
€3m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 2.1% · €6.7bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+2.4%
€7.6bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.21%
€683m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.07%
€228m
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−0.02%
€71m
Romania kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.01%
€42m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€6m
Romania kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€3m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.11% in returns · €349m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.07%
€225m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€124m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€2.5bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.41bn in 2022 to €0.19bn in 2025.
It bought €3.8bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.13bn in 2025 (−96%). It sold €1.1bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.26bn in 2025 (−76%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 80.1% of what it bought from Russia. For Romania: €228m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Romania's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€1.3bn
€0.50bnrange €0.22bn to €0.72bn
€2.3bn
A
Oil products
€3.4bn
€3.1bnrange €1.9bn to €3.7bn
€2bn
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€0.12bn
€0.11bnrange €64m to €0.13bn
€3.3bn
A
Coal
€96m
€90mrange €54m to €0.11bn
€20m
A
Other goods
€1.2bn
€1.1bn
–
All goods
€6.2bn
€4.9bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 51% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 49% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Romania applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Romania as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Romania. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €3.1bn extra from 2022 (0.98% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.40bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.11% of a year's GDP (€349m; likely €252m to €410m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Refugees from Ukraine
219,900 refugees from Ukraine, 12 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.42bn (0.13% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Romania: €472m spent on refugees, less €49m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €538m; counted here: €424m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount. Loans, full amount: €1.2bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.54bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €1.5bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €129m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€5.5bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Romania; what its firms kept of it, €0.11bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €71m (0.02% of one year's GDP).
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.68bn (0.21% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 15 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 13 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 13 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
40 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 12% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 75% modelled (C) and 13% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
It bought €0.13bn from Russia in 2025 (€3.8bn in 2021), and sold €0.26bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €6.7bn (2.1% of GDP) less than without the war.
How much has Romania given to Ukraine?
Romania's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €1.8bn, 0.58% of one year's GDP (likely 0.39% to 0.81%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Romania still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 80.1% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.13bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €3.8bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Is Romania helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +2.8% of one year's GDP (likely 0.99% to 4.6% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €6.7bn (2.1% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Why does War Balance differ from the Kiel tracker for Romania?
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €538m; counted here: €424m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount.
Did Romania cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 51% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 49% beyond what sanctions required.
War Balance