How much has the Netherlands given to Ukraine since 2022?
The Netherlands' support for Ukraine since 2022: €22.8bn (2.2% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €30.2bn (2.9% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €1.3bn gas cut off by Russia; Russia also lost €1.1bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 5.1% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 3.0% to 8.2% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 5.1% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
2.2%
€22.8bn
likely 1.8% to 2.6% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
2.9%
€30.2bn
likely 0.74% to 5.9% toward Ukraine very likely · 98%
Russia kept €30.2bn (2.9% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €1.3bn gas cut off by Russia.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.7% of GDP less (€28.6bn; likely 0.61% to 5.7% toward Ukraine)
The Netherlands' own gain from trade with Russia: The Netherlands kept 0.15% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€1.6bn; likely from 0.03% toward Russia to 0.29% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% of GDP in returns (€1.1bn).
Its story in short
Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €31.5bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 91% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 5% went beyond them. The other 4% was gas or oil Russia cut off itself.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €2.9bn (0.27% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €1.6bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 88% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €16.2bn in 2021, €1.9bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 61% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €7.0bn in 2021, €2.7bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 2.2% · €22.8bn
Hosting refugeesC
+1.1%
€11.8bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.82%
€8.7bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.23%
€2.4bn
The Netherlands kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−0.04%
€380m
Private donationsC
+0.03%
€338m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€40m
The Netherlands kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€35m
The Netherlands kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC
−<0.01%
€26m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€26m
The Netherlands kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−<0.01%
€18m
The Netherlands kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C
−<0.01%
€15m
The Netherlands kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 2.9% · €30.2bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+2.9%
€30.6bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.27%
€2.9bn
The Netherlands' companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.08%
€871m
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.08%
€863m
The Netherlands kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.05%
€481m
The Netherlands kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.03%
€365m
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−0.01%
€133m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+<0.01%
€93m
The Netherlands earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€92m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€78m
The Netherlands kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€15m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% in returns · €1.1bn
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.06%
€655m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€405m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€13.4bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €2.9bn in 2022 to €5.6bn in 2025.
It bought €16.2bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.9bn in 2025 (−88%). It sold €7bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.7bn in 2025 (−61%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 90.6% of what it bought from Russia. For the Netherlands: €2.9bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 88% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
The Netherlands' purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€15.3bn
€9.5bnrange €6.7bn to €15.2bn
€8.5bn
B
Oil products
€6bn
€5.6bnrange €4.1bn to €8.2bn
€10.2bn
B
Pipeline gas
€0.71bn
€0.66bnrange €0.47bn to €1.1bn
€1m
A
LNG
€6.8bn
€6.4bnrange €4.6bn to €9.6bn
€4.4bn
B
Coal
€1.2bn
€1.1bnrange €0.80bn to €1.7bn
€1.6bn
A
Other goods
€4.1bn
€4.2bn
–
All goods
€34.1bn
€27.5bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: B, 2025: B, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 91% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 4% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 5% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, the Netherlands applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists the Netherlands as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the Netherlands. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €11.3bn extra from 2022 (1.1% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €1.6bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.10% of a year's GDP (€1.1bn; likely €759m to €1.3bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €0.10bn (October 2024, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
141,275 refugees from Ukraine, 7.9 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €11.8bn (1.1% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For the Netherlands: €12.6bn spent on refugees, less €783m, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €24,011 per refugee per year (492,584 refugee-years).
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €11.2bn; counted here: €8.7bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €3.8bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €1.6bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €16.6bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €1.4bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€2.3bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in the Netherlands; what its firms kept of it, €0.48bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
The Netherlands' companies made less profit in Russia: €0.87bn (0.08% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €0.86bn (0.08% of one year's GDP). Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.13bn (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €4.3bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €1.9bn to €9.9bn; 0.41% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €93m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). The Netherlands kept more from shipping Russian oil: €15m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €148m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €141m to €487m); €818m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 6 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 5 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 5 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
45 sources back its parts: 15 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 18% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 81% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported national budget figures
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
The Netherlands' support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €22.8bn, 2.2% of one year's GDP (likely 1.8% to 2.6%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does the Netherlands trade with Russia?
It bought €1.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€16.2bn in 2021), and sold €2.7bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €30.2bn (2.9% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €1.3bn gas cut off by Russia.
Does the Netherlands still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 90.6% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.9bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €16.2bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Netherlands–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €1.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€16.2bn in 2021), and sold €2.7bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €22.8bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +5.1% of one year's GDP (likely 3.0% to 8.2% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Is the Netherlands helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +5.1% of one year's GDP (likely 3.0% to 8.2% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €30.2bn (2.9% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €1.3bn gas cut off by Russia. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does the Netherlands help Russia get around sanctions?
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €148m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €141m to €487m); €818m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
War Balance