Does Bulgaria support Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine
Bulgaria's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.68bn (0.72% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2.4bn (2.5% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €594m gas cut off by Russia; Russia also lost €100m of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 3.3% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 7.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 95%).
likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 7.3% toward Ukraine · €3.1bn · ≈ 0.71%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 3.3% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. Much of what Russia kept less is gas Russia cut off itself.
Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.72%
€685m
likely 0.30% to 1.3% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
2.5%
€2.4bn
likely from 0.80% toward Russia to 6.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 87%
Russia kept €2.4bn (2.5% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €594m gas cut off by Russia.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.5% of GDP less (€2.3bn; likely from 0.81% toward Russia to 6.4% toward Ukraine)
Bulgaria's own gain from trade with Russia: Bulgaria kept 0.02% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€19m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.11% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% of GDP in returns (€100m).
Its story in short
Gas cut off by Russia Much of what Russia kept less is gas Russia cut off itself. Of which gas Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of transit: €594m
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €265m (0.28% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €987m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 87% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €2.3bn in 2021, €299m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Hosts many refugees 78,350 refugees from Ukraine, 12 per 1,000 residents.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.72% · €685m
Hosting refugeesD
+0.34%
€320m
Its share of EU aidB
+0.25%
€238m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.16%
€153m
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.14%
€132m
Bulgaria kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereC
−0.13%
€125m
Private donationsD
+0.04%
€42m
Bulgaria kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−0.03%
€29m
Bulgaria kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−0.03%
€29m
Bulgaria kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−0.01%
€14m
Bulgaria kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€7m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€6m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 2.5% · €2.4bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+2.7%
€2.6bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.28%
€265m
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−0.17%
€159m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.16%
€156m
Bulgaria kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.01%
€11m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.01%
€10m
Bulgaria's companies made less profit in RussiaD
+<0.01%
€4m
Bulgaria kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€4m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+<0.01%
€2m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereC
+<0.01%
€2m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% in returns · €100m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.07%
€64m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€36m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€1.4bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.21bn in 2022 to €63m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €2.3bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.30bn in 2025 (−87%). It sold €0.46bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.46bn in 2025 (−0%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 81.0% of what it bought from Russia. For Bulgaria: €265m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 91% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Bulgaria's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€5.8bn
€3.4bnrange €2.5bn to €4.7bn
€5.7bn
A
Oil products
€1.1bn
€1bnrange €0.77bn to €1.6bn
€0.75bn
B
Pipeline gas
€1.2bn
€1.1bnrange €0.83bn to €1.6bn
€4.5bn
B
Coal
€0.21bn
€0.20bnrange €0.15bn to €0.25bn
€11m
A
Other goods
€1.3bn
€1.5bn
–
All goods
€9.6bn
€7.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: B, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 66% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 23% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 11% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Bulgaria applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Bulgaria as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Bulgaria. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €1.5bn extra from 2022 (1.6% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.99bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.10% of a year's GDP (€100m; likely €72m to €117m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Refugees from Ukraine
78,350 refugees from Ukraine, 12 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.32bn (0.34% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Bulgaria: €352m spent on refugees, less €32m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €256m; counted here: €132m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €0.34bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.15bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.42bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €40m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€5.7bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Bulgaria; what its firms kept of it, €0.21bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.16bn (0.17% of one year's GDP). Russia took €2m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely <€1m to €8m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.16bn (0.16% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
45 sources back its parts: 15 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 5% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 78% modelled (C) and 16% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
It bought €0.30bn from Russia in 2025 (€2.3bn in 2021), and sold €0.46bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €2.4bn (2.5% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €594m gas cut off by Russia.
How much has Bulgaria given to Ukraine?
Bulgaria's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.68bn, 0.72% of one year's GDP (likely 0.30% to 1.3%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Bulgaria still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 81.0% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.30bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €2.3bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Does Bulgaria support Russia?
In money terms the net is +3.3% of one year's GDP (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 7.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 95%). Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2.4bn (2.5% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €594m gas cut off by Russia. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Bulgaria–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €0.30bn from Russia in 2025 (€2.3bn in 2021), and sold €0.46bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.68bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +3.3% of one year's GDP (likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 7.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 95%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Did Bulgaria cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 66% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 23% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 11% beyond what sanctions required.
War Balance