Slovakia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €1.1bn (0.89% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €912m (0.75% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.5bn; the other parts take €1.6bn off it); Russia also lost €0.13bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.24% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 4.0% toward Russia to 4.8% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 58% toward Ukraine).
likely from 4.0% toward Russia to 4.8% toward Ukraine · €294m · ≈ 0.05%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.24% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly war-time prices on gas contracts, largest in 2022.
Chance toward Ukraine: 58%; 90% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.89%
€1.1bn
likely 0.45% to 1.4% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.75%
€912m
likely from 4.9% toward Russia to 3.8% toward Ukraine too close to call · 58% toward Russia
Russia kept €912m (0.75% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.5bn; the other parts take €1.6bn off it).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.79% of GDP more (€959m; likely from 5.0% toward Russia to 3.7% toward Ukraine)
Slovakia's own gain from trade with Russia: Slovakia kept 0.04% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€47m; likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.15% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.11% of GDP in returns (€131m).
Its story in short
Kept buying Russian pipeline oil (EU exemption) The EU's crude embargo exempted crude delivered by pipeline, and it kept buying Russian crude through the Druzhba pipeline. An alternative existed: the Adria pipeline from Croatia; Czechia, on the same pipeline, switched fully to crude via Italy and Germany (TAL/IKL) by 2025. A label only: the numbers do not change.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €2.5bn (2.1% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €724m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Sold Russia 75% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.4bn in 2021, €349m in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Major aid giver Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €612m (0.50% of GDP), number 16 of 162 economies for its size.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 58%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 12% larger, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.89% · €1.1bn
Hosting refugeesC
+0.30%
€358m
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.25%
€308m
Its share of EU aidB
+0.20%
€246m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.14%
€174m
Private donationsD
+0.04%
€53m
Slovakia kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−0.04%
€49m
Slovakia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−0.01%
€12m
Slovakia kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€7m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€5m
Slovakia kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
Slovakia kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.75% · €912m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−2.1%
€2.5bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.2%
€1.5bn
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.08%
€91m
Slovakia kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.04%
€43m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€5m
Slovakia's companies made less profit in RussiaD
+<0.01%
€4m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+<0.01%
€3m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+<0.01%
€2m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.11% in returns · €131m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.07%
€85m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€47m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€1.4bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.48bn in 2022 to €0.12bn in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €3bn from Russia in 2021 and €2bn in 2025 (−32%). It sold €1.4bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.35bn in 2025 (−75%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 87.7% of what it bought from Russia. For Slovakia: €2.5bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 98% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Slovakia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€9.6bn
€1.2bnrange €0m to €3bn
€10.1bn
B
Oil products
€4.3bn
€3.5bnrange €1.2bn to €5.6bn
<€1m
B
Pipeline gas
€9.6bn
€7.8bnrange €2.9bn to €12.4bn
€8.9bn
B
Coal
€47m
€38mrange €12m to €66m
€41m
B
Other goods
€1.7bn
€1.4bn
–
All goods
€25.3bn
€13.9bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: B, 2023: B, 2024: B, 2025: B, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
The EU's crude embargo exempted crude delivered by pipeline, and it kept buying Russian crude through the Druzhba pipeline. An alternative existed: the Adria pipeline from Croatia; Czechia, on the same pipeline, switched fully to crude via Italy and Germany (TAL/IKL) by 2025. A label only: the numbers do not change.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Slovakia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Slovakia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Slovakia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.56bn extra from 2022 (0.46% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.72bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.11% of a year's GDP (€131m; likely €95m to €154m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Refugees from Ukraine
148,970 refugees from Ukraine, 27 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.36bn (0.30% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Slovakia: €442m spent on refugees, less €84m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €753m; counted here: €308m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount. Loans, full amount: €0.38bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.13bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.55bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €49m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€4.1bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Slovakia; what its firms kept of it, €70m, is taken off its support.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €91m (0.08% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €25m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €23m to €80m); €45m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
43 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 10 research reports, 1 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 4% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 92% modelled (C) and 4% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Slovakia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €1.1bn, 0.89% of one year's GDP (likely 0.45% to 1.4%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Slovakia trade with Russia?
It bought €2bn from Russia in 2025 (€3bn in 2021), and sold €0.35bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €912m (0.75% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.5bn; the other parts take €1.6bn off it).
Does Slovakia still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 87.7% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €2bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €3bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Does Slovakia support Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.24% of one year's GDP (likely from 4.0% toward Russia to 4.8% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 58% toward Ukraine). Chance toward Ukraine: 58%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €912m (0.75% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.5bn; the other parts take €1.6bn off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Slovakia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €2bn from Russia in 2025 (€3bn in 2021), and sold €0.35bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €1.1bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.24% of one year's GDP (likely from 4.0% toward Russia to 4.8% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 58% toward Ukraine). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
How many Ukrainian refugees does Slovakia host, and what does it cost?
148,970 refugees from Ukraine, 27 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.36bn (0.30% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Slovakia: €442m spent on refugees, less €84m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
War Balance