War Balance
North Macedonia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €61m (0.42% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €359m (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€352m of €359m). The net is 2.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 0.87% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%).
Leaning toward Russia by
2.1% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Russia · 87%
likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 0.87% toward Ukraine · €298m · ≈ 0.44%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 2.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on gas contracts, largest in 2022).
Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.42%
€61m
likely 0.24% to 0.62% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
2.5%
€359m
likely from 4.5% toward Russia to 0.44% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 91%
Russia kept €359m (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€352m of €359m).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 85% smaller, the direction would flip.
Supported Ukraine with 0.42% · €61m
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.42% | €61m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.02% | €4m |
| North Macedonia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −0.02% | €2m |
| North Macedonia kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €1m |
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 2.5% · €359m
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −2.4% | €352m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.67% | €97m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.63% | €91m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.14bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€27m | −€169m | −€142m | −0.98% |
| 2023 | +€29m | −€132m | −€102m | −1.7% |
| 2024 | +€2m | −€53m | −€51m | −2.0% |
| 2025 | +€2m | −€34m | −€32m | −2.3% |
| 2026* | +€1m | +€29m | +€30m | −2.1% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
North Macedonia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | €60mnot in Kiel's tracker |
| Private donations and purchases | €4m |
| Money flowing back | −€3msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €61m |
Quality of the split: B
It bought €0.15bn from Russia in 2021 and €89m in 2025 (−43%). It sold €48m to Russia in 2021 and €70m in 2025 (+45%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 61.3% of what it bought from Russia. For North Macedonia: €352m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 99% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
North Macedonia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €13m | €13mrange €10m to €18m | not tracked | A |
| Pipeline gas | €0.76bn | €0.76bnrange €0.60bn to €1.1bn | €0.53bn | A |
| Other goods | €0.14bn | €0.15bn | – | |
| All goods | €0.92bn | €0.92bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Yes. North Macedonia is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists North Macedonia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by North Macedonia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.11bn extra from 2022 (0.79% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
20,741 refugees from Ukraine, 11 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025.
€54m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in North Macedonia; what its firms kept of it, €3m, is taken off its support.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €97m (0.67% of one year's GDP).
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Bulgaria | +3.3%+€3.1bnlikely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| Kosovo | +1.1%+€0.11bnlikely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| Greece | +0.08%+€0.18bnessentially zero |
| Albania | +0.07%+€16messentially zero |
| Serbia | −1.4%−€1.1bnlikely toward Russia · 84% |
| North Macedonia | −2.1%−€0.30bnlikely toward Russia · 87% |
25 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 10% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 74% modelled (C) and 16% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −2.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 0.87% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%). Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €359m (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€352m of €359m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €89m from Russia in 2025 (€0.15bn in 2021), and sold €70m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €359m (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€352m of €359m).
Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 85% smaller, the direction would flip.
North Macedonia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €61m, 0.42% of one year's GDP (likely 0.24% to 0.62%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bulgaria +3.3%, Kosovo +1.1%, Greece +0.08%, Albania +0.07%, Serbia −1.4%, North Macedonia −2.1%.
25 sources back its parts, 5 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Yes. North Macedonia is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists North Macedonia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by North Macedonia. Sources: HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads); Council of the EU, same statement (original URL).
Leaning toward Russia
25 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/north-macedonia/