How much has Luxembourg given to Ukraine since 2022?
Luxembourg's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.77bn (0.94% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €701m (0.86% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €1.4bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 3.5% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 2.2% to 5.6% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 3.5% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required. Much of the net is Russian money frozen here: the return Russia lost on its reserves and private assets, not a payment.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.94%
€766m
likely 0.57% to 1.9% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.86%
€701m
likely 0.30% to 2.4% toward Ukraine very likely · >99%
Russia kept €701m (0.86% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.77% of GDP less (€629m; likely 0.29% to 2.3% toward Ukraine)
Luxembourg's own gain from trade with Russia: Luxembourg kept 0.09% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€71m; likely from 0.20% toward Russia to 0.15% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 1.7% of GDP in returns (€1.4bn).
Its story in short
Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €341m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 11% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 89% went beyond them.
Major aid giver Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €456m (0.56% of GDP), number 13 of 162 economies for its size.
Froze Russian money Much of the net is Russian money frozen here: the return Russia lost on its reserves and private assets, not a payment. Russian money frozen: 1.7% of a year's GDP (€1.4bn; likely €479m to €2.4bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Rough data: mostly estimates 61% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.94% · €766m
Hosting refugeesC
+0.39%
€318m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.34%
€275m
Its share of EU aidB
+0.19%
€159m
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€17m
Luxembourg kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−0.01%
€9m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€5m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€2m
Luxembourg kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.86% · €701m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.37%
€303m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.29%
€233m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+0.09%
€72m
Luxembourg's companies made less profit in RussiaD
+0.08%
€62m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.03%
€29m
Luxembourg kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.01%
€9m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−<0.01%
€8m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 1.7% in returns · €1.4bn
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+1.7%
€1.4bn
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD
+0.05%
€43m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€0.76bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.18bn in 2022 to €0.15bn in 2025.
It bought €81m from Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025 (−98%). It sold €0.15bn to Russia in 2021 and €15m in 2025 (−90%). For Luxembourg: €8m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 100% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 11% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 89% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Luxembourg applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Luxembourg as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Luxembourg. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €79m extra from 2022 (0.10% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 1.7% of a year's GDP (€1.4bn; likely €479m to €2.4bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: <€1m (November 2025, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €5.5bn (December 2022, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
3,800 refugees from Ukraine, 5.6 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.32bn (0.39% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Luxembourg: €337m spent on refugees, less €18m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €376m; counted here: €275m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €0.23bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.10bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.49bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €49m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€34m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Luxembourg; what its firms kept of it, €10m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Its firms paid Russia less tax: €72m (0.09% of one year's GDP). Luxembourg's companies made less profit in Russia: €62m (0.08% of one year's GDP). Russia took €123m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €37m to €387m; 0.15% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.23bn (0.29% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 12 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 11 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 10 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
36 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 15% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 24% modelled (C) and 61% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Sources, by part
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen here D
Luxembourg's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.77bn, 0.94% of one year's GDP (likely 0.57% to 1.9%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Is Luxembourg helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +3.5% of one year's GDP (likely 2.2% to 5.6% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €701m (0.86% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How much Russian money is frozen in Luxembourg?
Russian money frozen: 1.7% of a year's GDP (€1.4bn; likely €479m to €2.4bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only. Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: <€1m (November 2025, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €5.5bn (December 2022, source).
Why does War Balance differ from the Kiel tracker for Luxembourg?
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €376m; counted here: €275m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026.
Did Luxembourg cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 11% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 89% beyond what sanctions required.
How much did Luxembourg give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €0.18bn; 2023 €0.15bn; 2024 €0.17bn; 2025 €0.15bn; 2026 (to August) €0.11bn. In total since 2022: €0.77bn (likely 0.57% to 1.9%).
War Balance