Does Norway trade with Russia, and how much has it given Ukraine?
Norway's support for Ukraine since 2022: €12.8bn (2.5% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2.0bn (0.40% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 2.9% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 2.4% to 3.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 2.9% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. What Russia kept less was partly required by sanctions, partly beyond them.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
2.5%
€12.8bn
likely 2.1% to 3.2% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.40%
€2.0bn
likely 0.08% to 0.75% toward Ukraine very likely · 98%
Russia kept €2.0bn (0.40% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.39% of GDP less (€2.0bn; likely 0.14% to 0.73% toward Ukraine)
Norway's own gain from trade with Russia: Norway kept 0.02% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€77m; likely from 0.19% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Partly its sanctions, partly beyond them Of the €2.0bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 41% was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 59% went beyond them.
Bought 89% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €2.0bn in 2021, €218m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Top-10 aid giver for its size Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €8.5bn (1.7% of GDP), number 4 of 162 economies for its size.
Hosts many refugees 86,255 refugees from Ukraine, 15 per 1,000 residents.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 2.5% · €12.8bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+1.7%
€8.4bn
Hosting refugeesC
+0.88%
€4.4bn
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€94m
Norway kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC
−0.01%
€65m
Norway kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−0.01%
€54m
Norway kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−<0.01%
€22m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€17m
Norway kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C
−<0.01%
€8m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€8m
Norway kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€7m
Norway kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€5m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.40% · €2.0bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.39%
€2.0bn
Norway's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.03%
€156m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+0.02%
€125m
Norway kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−0.02%
€112m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.02%
€79m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€48m
Norway kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€21m
Norway kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€12m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€4m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€3.2bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €1.4bn in 2022 to €2.8bn in 2025.
It bought €2bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.22bn in 2025 (−89%). It sold €0.38bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.10bn in 2025 (−73%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 27.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Norway: €79m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 14% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Norway's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€0.58bn
€0.52bnrange €0.46bn to €0.59bn
€0.55bn
A
LNG
€46m
€43mrange €38m to €48m
€45m
A
Coal
€15m
€14mrange €13m to €16m
not tracked
A
Other goods
€1.9bn
€1.8bn
–
All goods
€2.5bn
€2.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 41% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 59% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. Norway is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Norway as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Norway. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.25bn extra from 2022 (0.05% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €31m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Refugees from Ukraine
86,255 refugees from Ukraine, 15 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €4.4bn (0.88% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Norway: €4.5bn spent on refugees, less €126m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €11.5bn; counted here: €8.4bn — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €20.2bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €2.0bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€2.6bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Norway; what its firms kept of it, €0.16bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Norway's companies made less profit in Russia: €0.16bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €0.13bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russia took €1.7bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €1.0bn to €3.4bn; 0.34% of a year's GDP.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 14 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. NATO members: number 12 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
34 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 54% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 44% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Norway's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €12.8bn, 2.5% of one year's GDP (likely 2.1% to 3.2%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Norway trade with Russia?
It bought €0.22bn from Russia in 2025 (€2bn in 2021), and sold €0.10bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €2.0bn (0.40% of GDP) less than without the war.
Is Norway helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +2.9% of one year's GDP (likely 2.4% to 3.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2.0bn (0.40% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Norway–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €0.22bn from Russia in 2025 (€2bn in 2021), and sold €0.10bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €12.8bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +2.9% of one year's GDP (likely 2.4% to 3.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Did Norway cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 41% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 59% beyond what sanctions required.
How much did Norway give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €1.4bn; 2023 €2.1bn; 2024 €2.7bn; 2025 €2.8bn; 2026 (to August) €3.8bn. In total since 2022: €12.8bn (likely 2.1% to 3.2%).
Does Norway have sanctions on Russia?
Yes. Norway is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Norway as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Norway. Sources: Norway, Regulation of 15 August 2014 No. 1076 and government release on the 10th package (search summary, to be checked against the official text); HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1351, 29 June 2026 (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
War Balance