How much has the United States given to Ukraine since 2022?
The United States' support for Ukraine since 2022: €82.6bn (0.32% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €47.4bn (0.18% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €1.6bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.51% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.40% to 0.64% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.51% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by sanctions it set itself.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.32%
€82.6bn
likely 0.28% to 0.39% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.18%
€47.4bn
likely 0.09% to 0.30% toward Ukraine very likely · >99%
Russia kept €47.4bn (0.18% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.15% of GDP less (€39.9bn; likely 0.06% to 0.26% toward Ukraine)
The United States' own gain from trade with Russia: The United States kept 0.03% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€7.5bn; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€1.6bn).
Its story in short
Cut through its own sanctions Of the €39.6bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 74% was required by sanctions it set itself (oil import ban of March 2022, EO 14066), 26% went beyond them.
Bought 85% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €24.6bn in 2021, €3.8bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 56% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €5.5bn in 2021, €2.4bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.32% · €82.6bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.31%
€79.8bn
Private donationsC
+<0.01%
€2.6bn
Hosting refugeesC
+<0.01%
€1.9bn
The United States kept back part of its aid, spent at homeB
−<0.01%
€1.2bn
The United States kept part of others' aid, spent hereB
−<0.01%
€702m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€280m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€95m
The United States kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€92m
The United States kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€57m
The United States kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)B
−<0.01%
€41m
The United States kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereB
−<0.01%
€34m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.18% · €47.4bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.15%
€38.5bn
The United States' companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.02%
€4.7bn
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.01%
€2.8bn
The United States earned less from Russian oil and gas stakesD
+<0.01%
€2.0bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€1.5bn
The United States kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€458m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−<0.01%
€450m
The United States kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€444m
Russian owners kept less from their firms hereD
+<0.01%
€332m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€196m
The United States kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€103m
The United States earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€24m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €1.6bn
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+<0.01%
€837m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+<0.01%
€775m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€36bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €24.5bn in 2022 to €9.4bn in 2025.
It bought €24.6bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.8bn in 2025 (−85%). It sold €5.5bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.4bn in 2025 (−56%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.8% of what it bought from Russia. For the United States: €450m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
The United States' purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.50bn
€0.44bnrange €0.35bn to €0.55bn
€0.40bn
A
Oil products
€4.6bn
€4.3bnrange €3.4bn to €5.4bn
€3.4bn
C (estimate)
LNG
€28m
€27mrange €21m to €33m
not tracked
A
Coal
€92m
€87mrange €65m to €0.11bn
€52m
A
Other goods
€22.4bn
€21.9bn
–
All goods
€27.6bn
€26.7bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 74% required by sanctions it set itself, 26% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. The United States has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 6 March 2014. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. Separately, Russia lists the United States as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the United States. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €7.8bn extra from 2022 (0.03% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.36bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€1.6bn; likely €836m to €2.9bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €4.7bn (September 2023, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: no public figure.
Refugees from Ukraine
250,000 refugees from Ukraine, 0.7 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1.9bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For the United States: €3.7bn spent on refugees, less €1.8bn, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €115bn; counted here: €79.8bn — donated weapons at their market value; G7 loans repaid from Russian assets left out (Russia pays for them); military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €3.6bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €10.2bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€54.3bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in the United States; what its firms kept of it, €2.1bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
The United States' companies made less profit in Russia: €4.7bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €2.8bn (0.01% of one year's GDP). The United States earned less from Russian oil and gas stakes: €2bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russian owners kept less from their firms here: €0.33bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €13.2bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €9.0bn to €23.0bn; 0.05% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1.5bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). The United States kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.10bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €118m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €108m to €488m); €253m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 29 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. G7: number 6 of 7 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 23 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
40 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 58% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 38% modelled (C) and 3% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: reported each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
The United States' support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €82.6bn, 0.32% of one year's GDP (likely 0.28% to 0.39%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
United States–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €3.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€24.6bn in 2021), and sold €2.4bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €82.6bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.40% to 0.64% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Is the United States helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.40% to 0.64% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €47.4bn (0.18% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does the United States still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €3.8bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €24.6bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
United States–Russia trade: how much since 2022?
It bought €3.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€24.6bn in 2021), and sold €2.4bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €47.4bn (0.18% of GDP) less than without the war.
How much did the United States give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €24.5bn; 2023 €25.1bn; 2024 €19.5bn; 2025 €9.4bn; 2026 (to August) €4.1bn. In total since 2022: €82.6bn (likely 0.28% to 0.39%).
War Balance