Denmark's support for Ukraine since 2022: €11.2bn (2.9% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3.7bn (0.98% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €231m gas cut off by Russia; Russia also lost €0.49bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 4.0% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 3.3% to 5.0% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 4.0% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
2.9%
€11.2bn
likely 2.3% to 3.7% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.98%
€3.7bn
likely 0.50% to 1.5% toward Ukraine very likely · >99%
Russia kept €3.7bn (0.98% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €231m gas cut off by Russia.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.80% of GDP less (€3.1bn; likely 0.40% to 1.3% toward Ukraine)
Denmark's own gain from trade with Russia: Denmark kept 0.18% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€688m; likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.36% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€491m).
Its story in short
Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €2.6bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 73% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 18% went beyond them. The other 9% was gas or oil Russia cut off itself.
Bought 85% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.6bn in 2021, €240m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 80% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.2bn in 2021, €230m in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Top-10 aid giver for its size Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €10.4bn (2.7% of GDP), number 1 of 162 economies for its size.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€491m; likely €354m to €577m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 2.9% · €11.2bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+2.4%
€9.1bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.31%
€1.2bn
Hosting refugeesD
+0.24%
€923m
Private donationsD
+0.04%
€151m
Denmark kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC
−0.02%
€88m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€17m
Denmark kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C
−<0.01%
€12m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€5m
Denmark kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€2m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.98% · €3.7bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.61%
€2.3bn
Denmark's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.12%
€477m
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.10%
€380m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.07%
€283m
Denmark kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.05%
€174m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.01%
€56m
Denmark kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€34m
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC
+<0.01%
€5m
Denmark kept less from shipping Russian oilD
+<0.01%
€3m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €491m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.08%
€317m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.05%
€175m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€4.8bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €1.2bn in 2022 to €4bn in 2025.
It bought €1.6bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.24bn in 2025 (−85%). It sold €1.2bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.23bn in 2025 (−80%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 45.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Denmark: €5m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 73% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 9% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 18% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Denmark applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Denmark as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Denmark. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €1.4bn extra from 2022 (0.36% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€491m; likely €354m to €577m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Refugees from Ukraine
53,805 refugees from Ukraine, 9.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.92bn (0.24% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Denmark: €1.1bn spent on refugees, less €225m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €11.7bn; counted here: €9.1bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €1.7bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.76bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €2.5bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €2.2bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€1.5bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Denmark; what its firms kept of it, €0.10bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Denmark's companies made less profit in Russia: €0.48bn (0.12% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €0.38bn (0.10% of one year's GDP). Russia took €2.1bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €1.3bn to €4.7bn; 0.55% of a year's GDP.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 8 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 7 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 7 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
39 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 9 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 65% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 25% modelled (C) and 10% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Denmark's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €11.2bn, 2.9% of one year's GDP (likely 2.3% to 3.7%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Denmark trade with Russia?
It bought €0.24bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.6bn in 2021), and sold €0.23bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €3.7bn (0.98% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €231m gas cut off by Russia.
Is Denmark helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +4.0% of one year's GDP (likely 3.3% to 5.0% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3.7bn (0.98% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €231m gas cut off by Russia. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Denmark–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €0.24bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.6bn in 2021), and sold €0.23bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €11.2bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +4.0% of one year's GDP (likely 3.3% to 5.0% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Denmark still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 45.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.24bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €1.6bn in 2021; this data has no split by fuel for 2025.
Did Denmark cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 73% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 9% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 18% beyond what sanctions required.
War Balance