Italy's support for Ukraine since 2022: €12.7bn (0.60% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €18.8bn (0.89% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €1.1bn gas cut off by Russia; Russia also lost €3bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 1.6% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.60% to 2.8% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.6% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. What Russia kept less was partly required by sanctions, partly beyond them.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.60%
€12.7bn
likely 0.46% to 0.82% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.89%
€18.8bn
likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 2.0% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 91%
Russia kept €18.8bn (0.89% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €1.1bn gas cut off by Russia.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.91% of GDP less (€19.3bn; likely from 0.11% toward Russia to 2.0% toward Ukraine)
Italy's own gain from trade with Russia: Italy kept 0.02% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€528m; likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.14% of GDP in returns (€3.0bn).
Its story in short
Partly its sanctions, partly beyond them Of the €28.6bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 45% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 51% went beyond them. The other 4% was gas or oil Russia cut off itself.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €8.2bn (0.39% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Bought 90% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €16.5bn in 2021, €1.6bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Major aid giver Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €11.2bn (0.53% of GDP), number 15 of 162 economies for its size.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.14% of a year's GDP (€3.0bn; likely €2.2bn to €3.6bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.60% · €12.7bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.33%
€7.0bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.16%
€3.4bn
Hosting refugeesD
+0.07%
€1.5bn
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€446m
Undisclosed military aidC
+0.02%
€350m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€98m
Italy kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€40m
Italy kept part of others' aid, spent hereD
−<0.01%
€38m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€18m
Italy kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€11m
Italy kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D
−<0.01%
€8m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.89% · €18.8bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.3%
€28.3bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.39%
€8.2bn
Italy's companies made more profit in RussiaB
−0.03%
€685m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.03%
€601m
Its firms paid Russia more taxC
−0.01%
€293m
Italy kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€115m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€100m
Italy kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€74m
Italy kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€31m
Russian owners kept less from their firms hereD
+<0.01%
€12m
Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD
−<0.01%
€11m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.14% in returns · €3.0bn
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.09%
€1.9bn
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.05%
€1.1bn
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€11.3bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €2.9bn in 2022 to €2.3bn in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €16.5bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.6bn in 2025 (−90%). It sold €8.1bn to Russia in 2021 and €5bn in 2025 (−39%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 77.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Italy: €8.2bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 96% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Italy's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€6.9bn
€3.1bnrange €2bn to €4.2bn
€8.6bn
A
Oil products
€2.3bn
€2.2bnrange €1.9bn to €2.6bn
€2.5bn
A
Pipeline gas
€18.5bn
€17.8bnrange €15.5bn to €21.2bn
€11.2bn
A
LNG
€0.33bn
€0.32bnrange €0.28bn to €0.38bn
€0.25bn
A
Coal
€1.1bn
€1.1bnrange €0.92bn to €1.3bn
€0.64bn
A
Other goods
€9.5bn
€9.1bn
–
All goods
€38.6bn
€33.6bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 45% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 4% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 51% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Italy applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. Separately, Russia lists Italy as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Italy. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €18.5bn extra from 2022 (0.88% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €1.3bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.14% of a year's GDP (€3.0bn; likely €2.2bn to €3.6bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €2bn (4 July 2023, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
58,720 refugees from Ukraine, 1.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1.5bn (0.07% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Italy: €1.6bn spent on refugees, less €89m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €4.3bn; counted here: €3.4bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount. Loans, full amount: €10.4bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €4.6bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €12.5bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €1.1bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€2.7bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Italy; what its firms kept of it, €98m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Italy's companies made more profit in Russia: €0.69bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia more tax: €0.29bn (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €1.3bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €865m to €2.2bn; 0.06% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.60bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). Italy kept more from shipping Russian oil: €31m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €11m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €54m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €52m to €180m); €80m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 19 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 16 of 21 members toward Ukraine. G7: number 3 of 7 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 16 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
48 sources back its parts: 14 official statistics, 13 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 20% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 73% modelled (C) and 7% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
It bought €1.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€16.5bn in 2021), and sold €5bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €18.8bn (0.89% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €1.1bn gas cut off by Russia.
How much has Italy given to Ukraine?
Italy's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €12.7bn, 0.60% of one year's GDP (likely 0.46% to 0.82%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Italy still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 77.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.6bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €16.5bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Is Italy helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +1.6% of one year's GDP (likely 0.60% to 2.8% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €18.8bn (0.89% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €1.1bn gas cut off by Russia. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Did Italy cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 45% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 4% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 51% beyond what sanctions required.
How much did Italy give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €2.9bn; 2023 €3.4bn; 2024 €2.8bn; 2025 €2.3bn; 2026 (to August) €1.4bn. In total since 2022: €12.7bn (likely 0.46% to 0.82%).
War Balance