Canada's support for Ukraine since 2022: €8.8bn (0.42% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.7bn (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €95m of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.51% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.38% to 0.78% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.51% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.42%
€8.8bn
likely 0.30% to 0.68% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.08%
€1.7bn
likely 0.02% to 0.15% toward Ukraine very likely · 98%
Russia kept €1.7bn (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.08% of GDP less (€1.7bn; likely 0.02% to 0.15% toward Ukraine)
Canada's own gain from trade with Russia: Canada kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€89m; likely from 0.03% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€95m).
Its story in short
Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €1.6bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 39% was required by sanctions it set itself (petroleum import ban of March 2022), 61% went beyond them.
Bought 96% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.4bn in 2021, €52m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.42% · €8.8bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.32%
€6.6bn
Hosting refugeesC
+0.09%
€1.8bn
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€425m
Canada kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€51m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€46m
Canada kept back part of its aid, spent at homeB
−<0.01%
€40m
Canada kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€13m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€12m
Canada kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€7m
Canada kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)B
−<0.01%
€2m
Canada kept part of others' aid, spent hereB
−<0.01%
€2m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.08% · €1.7bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.07%
€1.5bn
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+<0.01%
€97m
Canada's companies made less profit in RussiaD
+<0.01%
€91m
Canada kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€23m
Russian owners kept less from their firms hereD
+<0.01%
€20m
Canada kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€19m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€15m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+<0.01%
€6m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−<0.01%
€4m
Canada kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€2m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €95m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD
+<0.01%
€77m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereC
+<0.01%
€18m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€3bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €2.5bn in 2022 to €1.3bn in 2025.
It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €52m in 2025 (−96%). It sold €0.44bn to Russia in 2021 and €85m in 2025 (−81%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 31.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Canada: €4m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 39% required by sanctions it set itself, 61% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. Canada has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 17 March 2014. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Canada as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Canada. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €80m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€95m; likely €29m to €484m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €0.11bn (November 2025, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)).
Refugees from Ukraine
240,000 refugees from Ukraine, 5.8 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1.8bn (0.09% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Canada: €2.4bn spent on refugees, less €573m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €14.9bn; counted here: €6.6bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; G7 loans repaid from Russian assets left out (Russia pays for them); military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €5.1bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.53bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €1.6bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €1.3bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€2.1bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Canada; what its firms kept of it, €0.11bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Its firms paid Russia less tax: €97m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Canada's companies made less profit in Russia: €91m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €780m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €411m to €1.8bn; 0.04% of a year's GDP.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 28 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. G7: number 5 of 7 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 22 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
39 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 93% modelled (C) and 7% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Canada's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €8.8bn, 0.42% of one year's GDP (likely 0.30% to 0.68%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Is Canada helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.38% to 0.78% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.7bn (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Canada–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €52m from Russia in 2025 (€1.4bn in 2021), and sold €85m to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €8.8bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.51% of one year's GDP (likely 0.38% to 0.78% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Canada trade with Russia?
It bought €52m from Russia in 2025 (€1.4bn in 2021), and sold €85m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.7bn (0.08% of GDP) less than without the war.
Did Canada cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 39% required by sanctions it set itself, 61% beyond what sanctions required.
How much did Canada give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €2.5bn; 2023 €2.1bn; 2024 €1.5bn; 2025 €1.3bn; 2026 (to August) €1.4bn. In total since 2022: €8.8bn (likely 0.30% to 0.68%).
War Balance