Croatia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.66bn (0.85% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €438m (0.56% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €87m of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 1.5% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.69% to 3.9% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.5% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.85%
€659m
likely 0.64% to 1.2% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.56%
€438m
likely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.0% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 85%
Russia kept €438m (0.56% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.55% of GDP less (€427m; likely from 0.25% toward Russia to 2.9% toward Ukraine)
Croatia's own gain from trade with Russia: Croatia kept 0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€11m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.06% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.11% of GDP in returns (€87m).
Its story in short
Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €550m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 61% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 39% went beyond them.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €228m (0.29% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €228m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Major aid giver Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €486m (0.63% of GDP), number 12 of 162 economies for its size.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.11% of a year's GDP (€87m; likely €63m to €103m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.85% · €659m
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.31%
€237m
Its share of EU aidB
+0.27%
€209m
Hosting refugeesD
+0.23%
€175m
Private donationsD
+0.04%
€35m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.01%
€8m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€4m
Croatia kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€4m
Croatia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€3m
Croatia kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€3m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.56% · €438m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.69%
€539m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.29%
€228m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.15%
€114m
Croatia kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.01%
€9m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€2m
Croatia's companies made less profit in RussiaD
+<0.01%
€2m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.11% in returns · €87m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.07%
€56m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€31m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€0.48bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.15bn in 2022 to €72m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €0.46bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.16bn in 2025 (−65%). It sold €0.21bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.28bn in 2025 (+30%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 70.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Croatia: €228m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 42% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Croatia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€77m
€0.17bnrange €51m to €0.29bn
€0.98bn
A
Oil products
€0.66bn
€0.68bnrange €0.48bn to €0.89bn
€0.71bn
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€0m
€77mrange €43m to €0.11bn
€0.22bn
A
Coal
€0.11bn
€0.15bnrange €88m to €0.20bn
€87m
A
Other goods
€0.20bn
€0.18bn
–
All goods
€1bn
€1.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 61% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 39% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Croatia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Croatia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Croatia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.56bn extra from 2022 (0.72% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.23bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.11% of a year's GDP (€87m; likely €63m to €103m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Refugees from Ukraine
30,295 refugees from Ukraine, 7.8 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.18bn (0.23% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Croatia: €187m spent on refugees, less €12m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €374m; counted here: €237m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €0.30bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.14bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.38bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €47m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.25bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Croatia; what its firms kept of it, €10m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russia took €1m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely <€1m to €7m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.11bn (0.15% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 21 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 18 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 18 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
36 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 13% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 66% modelled (C) and 22% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Croatia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.66bn, 0.85% of one year's GDP (likely 0.64% to 1.2%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Croatia trade with Russia?
It bought €0.16bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.46bn in 2021), and sold €0.28bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €438m (0.56% of GDP) less than without the war.
Is Croatia helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +1.5% of one year's GDP (likely 0.69% to 3.9% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €438m (0.56% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Croatia still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 70.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.16bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €0.46bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Why does War Balance differ from the Kiel tracker for Croatia?
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €374m; counted here: €237m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026.
Did Croatia cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 61% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 39% beyond what sanctions required.
War Balance