War Balance
Iceland's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.27bn (0.91% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €83m (0.28% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 1.2% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.56% to 3.1% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Toward Ukraine by
1.2% of a year's GDP since 2022
very likely · >99%
likely 0.56% to 3.1% toward Ukraine · €348m · ≈ 0.26%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 1.2% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. What Russia kept less was partly required by sanctions, partly beyond them.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.91%
€265m
likely 0.40% to 2.3% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.28%
€83m
likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 88%
Russia kept €83m (0.28% of GDP) less than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Supported Ukraine with 0.91% · €265m
| Hosting refugeesD | +0.59% | €171m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.31% | €90m |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €6m |
| Iceland kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −0.02% | €4m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Iceland kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.28% · €83m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.35% | €101m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.06% | €19m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.01% | €3m |
| Iceland's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Iceland kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Iceland kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€88m. Support for Ukraine rose from €24m in 2022 to €76m in 2025.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€24m | +€15m | +€39m | +0.13% |
| 2023 | +€52m | +€23m | +€74m | +0.39% |
| 2024 | +€52m | +€22m | +€74m | +0.64% |
| 2025 | +€76m | +€11m | +€88m | +0.94% |
| 2026* | +€61m | +€12m | +€73m | +1.2% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Iceland's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | €46mrange €35m to €55m; Kiel: €57m |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €14mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €1m |
| Humanitarian aid | €31m |
| Refugee hosting | €0.17bn |
| Private donations and purchases | €7m |
| Money flowing back | −€5msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.27bn |
Quality of the split: B
It bought €40m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025 (−100%). It sold €31m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025 (−96%). For Iceland: €3m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 60% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 40% beyond what sanctions required.
Yes. Iceland is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Iceland as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Iceland. Checked 27 October 2026.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
4,800 refugees from Ukraine, 12 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.17bn (0.59% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Iceland: €182m spent on refugees, less €11m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €101m; counted here: €90m — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €5m. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €6m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Russia took €2m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely <€1m to €20m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.
In the map's ranking: number 24 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. NATO members: number 20 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Switzerland | +1.0%+€8.7bnvery likely · >99% |
| United Kingdom | +1.8%+€58.4bnvery likely · >99% |
| Norway | +2.9%+€14.8bnvery likely · >99% |
| Moldova | +6.9%+€1.1bnvery likely · 97% |
28 sources back its parts: 9 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 22% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 28% modelled (C) and 49% rough indications (D).
Iceland's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.27bn, 0.91% of one year's GDP (likely 0.40% to 2.3%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
4,800 refugees from Ukraine, 12 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.17bn (0.59% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Iceland: €182m spent on refugees, less €11m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
In money terms the net is +1.2% of one year's GDP (likely 0.56% to 3.1% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €83m (0.28% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €101m; counted here: €90m — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 60% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 40% beyond what sanctions required.
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €24m; 2023 €52m; 2024 €52m; 2025 €76m; 2026 (to August) €61m. In total since 2022: €0.27bn (likely 0.40% to 2.3%).
Yes. Iceland is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Iceland as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Iceland. Sources: HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads); Council of the EU, same statement (original URL).
Toward Ukraine · number 24 of 32
28 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/iceland/