How much has the United Kingdom given to Ukraine since 2022?
The United Kingdom's support for Ukraine since 2022: €18.4bn (0.58% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €34.9bn (1.1% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €5bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 1.8% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 1.3% to 2.4% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.8% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by sanctions it set itself.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.58%
€18.4bn
likely 0.45% to 0.78% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
1.1%
€34.9bn
likely 0.56% to 1.6% toward Ukraine very likely · >99%
Russia kept €34.9bn (1.1% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.82% of GDP less (€26.3bn; likely 0.31% to 1.3% toward Ukraine)
The United Kingdom's own gain from trade with Russia: The United Kingdom kept 0.27% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€8.6bn; likely 0.13% to 0.37% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.16% of GDP in returns (€5.0bn).
Its story in short
Cut through its own sanctions Of the €24.6bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 71% was required by sanctions it set itself (oil import ban from December 2022 and other import bans), 29% went beyond them.
Bought 96% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €19.6bn in 2021, €797m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 63% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €3.3bn in 2021, €1.2bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.16% of a year's GDP (€5.0bn; likely €3.1bn to €8.6bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.58% · €18.4bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.38%
€12.1bn
Hosting refugeesC
+0.18%
€5.7bn
Private donationsC
+0.03%
€810m
The United Kingdom kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€140m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€91m
The United Kingdom kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC
−<0.01%
€80m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€25m
The United Kingdom kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€21m
The United Kingdom kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−<0.01%
€17m
The United Kingdom kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€10m
The United Kingdom kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C
−<0.01%
€7m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.1% · €34.9bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.76%
€24.2bn
The United Kingdom earned less from Russian oil and gas stakesD
+0.22%
€7.0bn
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.05%
€1.7bn
The United Kingdom's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.05%
€1.6bn
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.03%
€987m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.02%
€605m
The United Kingdom kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€269m
Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD
−<0.01%
€199m
Russian owners kept less from their firms hereD
+<0.01%
€192m
The United Kingdom kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€188m
The United Kingdom kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€162m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€88m
The United Kingdom earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€24m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.16% in returns · €5.0bn
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereC
+0.10%
€3.2bn
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD
+0.06%
€1.8bn
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€12.6bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €5.4bn in 2022 to €3.1bn in 2025.
It bought €19.6bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.80bn in 2025 (−96%). It sold €3.3bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.2bn in 2025 (−63%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 31.8% of what it bought from Russia. For the United Kingdom: €605m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 60% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
The United Kingdom's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.47bn
€0.41bnrange €0.36bn to €0.45bn
€0.22bn
A
Oil products
€1.7bn
€1.7bnrange €1.5bn to €2bn
€2bn
C (estimate)
LNG
€0.49bn
€0.46bnrange €0.41bn to €0.51bn
€0.40bn
A
Coal
€0.26bn
€0.25bnrange €0.22bn to €0.28bn
€0.17bn
A
Other goods
€5bn
€5.4bn
–
All goods
€8bn
€8.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 71% required by sanctions it set itself, 29% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. The United Kingdom has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 31 December 2020. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists the United Kingdom as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by the United Kingdom. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €4.4bn extra from 2022 (0.14% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.20bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.16% of a year's GDP (€5.0bn; likely €3.1bn to €8.6bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure (estimate: about €9.1bn); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €33.9bn (May 2025, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
270,860 refugees from Ukraine, 3.9 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €5.7bn (0.18% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For the United Kingdom: €6.5bn spent on refugees, less €800m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €22.8bn; counted here: €12.1bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; G7 loans repaid from Russian assets left out (Russia pays for them); military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €4.4bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.12bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €11bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €1.9bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€6.1bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in the United Kingdom; what its firms kept of it, €0.27bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
The United Kingdom earned less from Russian oil and gas stakes: €7bn (0.22% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €1.7bn (0.05% of one year's GDP). The United Kingdom's companies made less profit in Russia: €1.6bn (0.05% of one year's GDP). Russian owners kept less from their firms here: €0.19bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €8.3bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €5.1bn to €16.2bn; 0.26% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.99bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). The United Kingdom kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.27bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €0.20bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €18m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €17m to €77m); €85m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 17 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. G7: number 2 of 7 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 15 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
42 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 83% modelled (C) and 17% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
It bought €0.80bn from Russia in 2025 (€19.6bn in 2021), and sold €1.2bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €34.9bn (1.1% of GDP) less than without the war.
How much has the United Kingdom given to Ukraine?
The United Kingdom's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €18.4bn, 0.58% of one year's GDP (likely 0.45% to 0.78%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
United Kingdom–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €0.80bn from Russia in 2025 (€19.6bn in 2021), and sold €1.2bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €18.4bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +1.8% of one year's GDP (likely 1.3% to 2.4% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Is the United Kingdom helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +1.8% of one year's GDP (likely 1.3% to 2.4% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €34.9bn (1.1% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Did the United Kingdom cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 71% required by sanctions it set itself, 29% beyond what sanctions required.
Does the United Kingdom still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 31.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.80bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €19.6bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
War Balance