Latvia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.75bn (1.9% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.4bn (3.5% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€983m of €1.4bn), of which €72m gas cut off by Russia. The net is 5.6% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 3.2% to 8.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 5.6% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
1.9%
€755m
likely 1.4% to 2.8% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
3.5%
€1.4bn
likely 1.2% to 6.5% toward Ukraine very likely · 99%
Russia kept €1.4bn (3.5% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€983m of €1.4bn), of which €72m gas cut off by Russia.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.5% of GDP less (€1.4bn; likely 1.2% to 6.3% toward Ukraine)
Latvia's own gain from trade with Russia: Latvia kept 0.05% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€20m; likely from 0.53% toward Russia to 0.41% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€49m).
Its story in short
Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €720m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 88% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 2% went beyond them. The other 10% was gas or oil Russia cut off itself.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €356m (0.92% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €352m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 93% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.2bn in 2021, €86m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Top-10 aid giver for its size Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €495m (1.3% of GDP), number 7 of 162 economies for its size.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 1.9% · €755m
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.89%
€345m
Hosting refugeesC
+0.67%
€260m
Its share of EU aidB
+0.30%
€116m
Private donationsD
+0.09%
€33m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.04%
€17m
Latvia kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−0.02%
€9m
Latvia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€3m
Latvia kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€3m
Latvia kept back part of its aid, spent at homeB
−<0.01%
€2m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 3.5% · €1.4bn
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+2.5%
€983m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.7%
€671m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.92%
€356m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.08%
€30m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+0.06%
€24m
Latvia's companies made less profit in RussiaD
+0.06%
€24m
Latvia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.06%
€24m
Latvia kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.04%
€15m
Latvia kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.01%
€5m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €49m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.08%
€31m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€17m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€0.58bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.23bn in 2022 to €0.11bn in 2025.
It bought €1.2bn from Russia in 2021 and €86m in 2025 (−93%). It sold €0.70bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.59bn in 2025 (−15%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 27.6% of what it bought from Russia. For Latvia: €356m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 97% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Latvia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€0.59bn
€0.86bnrange €0.63bn to €1.1bn
€2.2bn
A
Pipeline gas
€0.21bn
€0.22bnrange €0.16bn to €0.28bn
€0.32bn
A
Coal
€20m
€27mrange €20m to €35m
€57m
A
Other goods
€1.6bn
€1.5bn
–
All goods
€2.4bn
€2.6bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 88% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 10% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 2% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Latvia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Latvia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Latvia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.83bn extra from 2022 (2.1% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.35bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€49m; likely €35m to €57m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €0.15bn (December 2025, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)).
Refugees from Ukraine
31,865 refugees from Ukraine, 17 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.26bn (0.67% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Latvia: €275m spent on refugees, less €15m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €727m; counted here: €345m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €0.18bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €77m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.32bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €125m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.85bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Latvia; what its firms kept of it, €18m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russia took €3m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely <€1m to €29m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.98bn (2.5% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €28m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €27m to €95m); €92m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 5 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 4 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 4 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
40 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 4% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 59% modelled (C) and 37% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Sources, by part
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D
Latvia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.75bn, 1.9% of one year's GDP (likely 1.4% to 2.8%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Latvia trade with Russia?
It bought €86m from Russia in 2025 (€1.2bn in 2021), and sold €0.59bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.4bn (3.5% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€983m of €1.4bn), of which €72m gas cut off by Russia.
Is Latvia helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +5.6% of one year's GDP (likely 3.2% to 8.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.4bn (3.5% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€983m of €1.4bn), of which €72m gas cut off by Russia. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Latvia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €86m from Russia in 2025 (€1.2bn in 2021), and sold €0.59bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.75bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +5.6% of one year's GDP (likely 3.2% to 8.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Did Latvia cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 88% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 10% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 2% beyond what sanctions required.
How many Ukrainian refugees does Latvia host, and what does it cost?
31,865 refugees from Ukraine, 17 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.26bn (0.67% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Latvia: €275m spent on refugees, less €15m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
War Balance