War Balance
Slovenia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.49bn (0.78% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €154m (0.25% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€460m; the other parts take €305m off it); Russia also lost €79m of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.66% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 88%).
Leaning toward Ukraine by
0.66% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Ukraine · 88%
likely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine · €417m · ≈ 0.14%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.66% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly war-time prices on oil, largest in 2022.
Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.78%
€493m
likely 0.50% to 1.5% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.25%
€154m
likely from 1.1% toward Russia to 2.1% toward Ukraine too close to call · 58% toward Russia
Russia kept €154m (0.25% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€460m; the other parts take €305m off it).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€79m).
Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 91% larger, the direction would flip.
Supported Ukraine with 0.78% · €493m
| Hosting refugeesC | +0.31% | €196m |
| Its share of EU aidB | +0.30% | €188m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansC | +0.11% | €72m |
| Private donationsD | +0.04% | €27m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.01% | €8m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €3m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.25% · €154m
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.73% | €460m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.57% | €356m |
| Slovenia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.08% | €51m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.05% | €32m |
| Slovenia's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +0.04% | €23m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €4m |
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €79m
| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC | +0.08% | €51m |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD | +0.04% | €28m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.54bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.10bn in 2022 to €98m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€105m | −€645m | +€6m | −€535m | −0.85% |
| 2023 | +€102m | +€106m | +€25m | +€233m | −0.48% |
| 2024 | +€102m | +€121m | +€22m | +€245m | −0.09% |
| 2025 | +€98m | +€80m | +€16m | +€194m | +0.22% |
| 2026* | +€86m | +€183m | +€10m | +€279m | +0.66% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Slovenia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | €45mrange €2m to €0.12bn; Kiel: €0.16bn |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €3mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €3m |
| Humanitarian aid | €26m |
| Refugee hosting | €0.20bn |
| Share of EU aid | €0.19bnof which military: €1m |
| Private donations and purchases | €35m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.49bn |
Quality of the split: C
It bought €0.37bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.14bn in 2025 (−62%). It sold €0.90bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.3bn in 2025 (+43%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 74.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Slovenia: €460m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 46% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Slovenia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €0.94bn | €0.85bnrange €0.74bn to €1bn | €0.98bn | A |
| Pipeline gas | €73m | €69mrange €61m to €83m | €0.80bn | A |
| Coal | €54m | €50mrange €44m to €61m | €21m | A |
| Other goods | €0.71bn | €0.87bn | – | |
| All goods | €1.8bn | €1.8bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Yes. As an EU member, Slovenia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Slovenia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Slovenia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.36bn extra from 2022 (0.57% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€79m; likely €57m to €92m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
11,535 refugees from Ukraine, 5.4 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.20bn (0.31% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Slovenia: €196m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €185m; counted here: €72m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €0.27bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.12bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.34bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €60m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
€12m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Slovenia; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.
Russia took €15m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €6m to €39m; 0.02% of a year's GDP.
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Italy | +1.6%+€34.4bnvery likely · >99% |
| Croatia | +1.5%+€1.2bnvery likely · >99% |
| Slovenia | +0.66%+€0.42bnlikely toward Ukraine · 88% |
| Austria | +0.45%+€2.1bnlikely toward Ukraine · 68% |
| Hungary | −6.0%−€11.4bnvery likely · 97% |
33 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 13% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 77% modelled (C) and 11% rough indications (D).
Slovenia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.49bn, 0.78% of one year's GDP (likely 0.50% to 1.5%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
In money terms the net is +0.66% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 88%). Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €154m (0.25% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€460m; the other parts take €305m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
In money terms: it bought €0.14bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.37bn in 2021), and sold €1.3bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.49bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.66% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 88%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 74.2% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.14bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €0.37bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
It bought €0.14bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.37bn in 2021), and sold €1.3bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €154m (0.25% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€460m; the other parts take €305m off it).
Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 91% larger, the direction would flip.
Yes. As an EU member, Slovenia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Slovenia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Slovenia. Sources: Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated); Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office).
Leaning toward Ukraine
33 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/slovenia/