Does Hungary support Russia? What the money flows show
Hungary's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.68bn (0.36% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €12.3bn (6.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€9.8bn of €12.3bn; its volumes barely changed); Russia also lost €0.20bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 6.0% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.72% to 9.8% toward Russia; very likely · 97%).
likely 0.72% to 9.8% toward Russia · €11.4bn · ≈ 1.3%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 6.0% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on gas contracts, largest in 2022). Its volumes barely changed: it is the price.
Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.36%
€676m
likely 0.17% to 0.53% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
6.4%
€12.3bn
likely 1.2% to 10.2% toward Russia very likely · 98%
Russia kept €12.3bn (6.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€9.8bn of €12.3bn; its volumes barely changed).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 6.0% of GDP more (€11.5bn; likely 0.77% to 9.8% toward Russia)
Hungary's own gain from trade with Russia: Hungary kept 0.42% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€803m; likely 0.21% to 0.76% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% of GDP in returns (€197m).
Its story in short
Kept buying Russian pipeline oil (EU exemption) The EU's crude embargo exempted crude delivered by pipeline, and it kept buying Russian crude through the Druzhba pipeline. An alternative existed: the Adria pipeline from Croatia; Czechia, on the same pipeline, switched fully to crude via Italy and Germany (TAL/IKL) by 2025. A label only: the numbers do not change.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €9.8bn (5.1% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war. Its volumes barely changed: it is the price.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €727m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.10% of a year's GDP (€197m; likely €142m to €231m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.36% · €676m
Its share of EU aidB
+0.19%
€364m
Hosting refugeesD
+0.09%
€163m
Private donationsD
+0.04%
€83m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.03%
€54m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€10m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€6m
Hungary kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€4m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 6.4% · €12.3bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−5.1%
€9.8bn
Russia kept more from its nuclear projects and loansD
−0.41%
€783m
Hungary's companies made more profit in RussiaB
−0.41%
€773m
Its firms paid Russia more taxC
−0.40%
€763m
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.22%
€425m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.15%
€286m
Hungary earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.02%
€37m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€14m
Hungary kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€7m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% in returns · €197m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.07%
€127m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€70m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€8bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.27bn in 2022 to €0.11bn in 2025.
It bought €3.5bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.6bn in 2025 (+1%). It sold €1.9bn to Russia in 2021 and €1bn in 2025 (−46%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 87.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Hungary: €9.8bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 99% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Hungary's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€9.2bn
€6.1bnrange €4.7bn to €7.9bn
€9.8bn
A
Oil products
€24m
€24mrange €18m to €32m
€17m
A
Pipeline gas
€20.9bn
€20.2bnrange €16.5bn to €25.8bn
€18.2bn
A
Coal
€15m
€15mrange €12m to €19m
€8m
A
Other goods
€1.3bn
€1.3bn
–
All goods
€31.5bn
€27.5bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
The EU's crude embargo exempted crude delivered by pipeline, and it kept buying Russian crude through the Druzhba pipeline. An alternative existed: the Adria pipeline from Croatia; Czechia, on the same pipeline, switched fully to crude via Italy and Germany (TAL/IKL) by 2025. A label only: the numbers do not change.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Hungary applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Hungary as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Hungary. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.21bn extra from 2022 (0.11% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.73bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.10% of a year's GDP (€197m; likely €142m to €231m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.
Refugees from Ukraine
45,075 refugees from Ukraine, 4.7 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.16bn (0.09% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Hungary: €180m spent on refugees, less €17m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €54m; counted here: €54m — loans at their gift value, not their full amount. Loans, full amount: €0.56bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.20bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.84bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €73m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.22bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Hungary; what its firms kept of it, €4m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Hungary's companies made more profit in Russia: €0.77bn (0.41% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia more tax: €0.76bn (0.40% of one year's GDP). Russia took €411m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €234m to €573m; 0.22% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.29bn (0.15% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €17m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €16m to €59m); €152m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 3 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 1 of 1 members toward Russia. NATO members: number 1 of 2 members toward Russia.
42 sources back its parts: 14 official statistics, 8 research reports, 1 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 9% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 81% modelled (C) and 10% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
It bought €3.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€3.5bn in 2021), and sold €1bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €12.3bn (6.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€9.8bn of €12.3bn; its volumes barely changed).
Does Hungary support Russia?
In money terms the net is −6.0% of one year's GDP (likely 0.72% to 9.8% toward Russia; very likely · 97%). Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €12.3bn (6.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€9.8bn of €12.3bn; its volumes barely changed). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Hungary still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 87.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €3.6bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €3.5bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
How much has Hungary given to Ukraine?
Hungary's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.68bn, 0.36% of one year's GDP (likely 0.17% to 0.53%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Hungary–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €3.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€3.5bn in 2021), and sold €1bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.68bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −6.0% of one year's GDP (likely 0.72% to 9.8% toward Russia; very likely · 97%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
How much did Hungary give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €0.27bn; 2023 €0.18bn; 2024 €0.15bn; 2025 €0.11bn; 2026 (to August) −€36m. In total since 2022: €0.68bn (likely 0.17% to 0.53%).
War Balance