Belgium's support for Ukraine since 2022: €5.8bn (0.97% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3.7bn (0.62% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €10.8bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 3.4% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 2.2% to 4.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 3.4% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to. Much of the net is Russian money frozen here: the return Russia lost on its reserves and private assets, not a payment.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.97%
€5.8bn
likely 0.75% to 1.4% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.62%
€3.7bn
likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 1.8% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 79%
Russia kept €3.7bn (0.62% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.63% of GDP less (€3.7bn; likely from 0.46% toward Russia to 1.8% toward Ukraine)
Belgium's own gain from trade with Russia: Belgium kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€26m; likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 1.8% of GDP in returns (€10.8bn).
Its story in short
Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €4.8bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 100% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 0% went beyond them.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €3.1bn (0.52% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €671m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 60% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €6.5bn in 2021, €2.6bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Major aid giver Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €3.8bn (0.64% of GDP), number 11 of 162 economies for its size.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.97% · €5.8bn
Hosting refugeesC
+0.34%
€2.0bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.33%
€2.0bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.29%
€1.7bn
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€126m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€32m
Belgium kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€23m
Belgium kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€7m
Belgium kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC
−<0.01%
€5m
Belgium kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−<0.01%
€5m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€4m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.62% · €3.7bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.80%
€4.7bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.52%
€3.1bn
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.33%
€1.9bn
Belgium's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.02%
€98m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+0.01%
€89m
Belgium earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.01%
€81m
Belgium kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€51m
Russian owners kept less from their firms hereC
+<0.01%
€31m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€11m
Belgium kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€7m
Belgium kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€1m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 1.8% in returns · €10.8bn
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+1.2%
€7.4bn
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.57%
€3.4bn
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€6.3bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €0.90bn in 2022 to €1.3bn in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €6.5bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.6bn in 2025 (−60%). It sold €3.4bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.2bn in 2025 (−35%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 49.7% of what it bought from Russia. For Belgium: €3.1bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 69% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Belgium's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€4m
€3mrange €3m to €4m
not tracked
A
Oil products
€6.3bn
€5.1bnrange €3.9bn to €6.8bn
€7.6bn
A
Pipeline gas
€0.36bn
€0.30bnrange €0.23bn to €0.40bn
€13m
A
LNG
€8.4bn
€7.6bnrange €5.2bn to €10.5bn
€12.9bn
A
Coal
€0.52bn
€0.42bnrange €0.33bn to €0.56bn
€0.25bn
A
Other goods
€7.4bn
€7bn
–
All goods
€23bn
€20.4bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 100% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 0% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Belgium applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Belgium as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Belgium. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €1.3bn extra from 2022 (0.22% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.67bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 1.8% of a year's GDP (€10.8bn; likely €7.9bn to €12.1bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €185bn (December 2025, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €10bn (February 2025, source); €55bn of Russian investors' securities blocked through the sanctioned depository NSD, counted apart (February 2025). Euroclear reports €202bn of sanctioned Russian assets on its balance sheet (June 2026); that figure overlaps the central bank's and is not added to it.
Refugees from Ukraine
95,640 refugees from Ukraine, 8.1 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €2bn (0.34% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Belgium: €2.0bn spent on refugees, less €29m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €3.3bn; counted here: €1.7bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €2.8bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €1.3bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €5bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €993m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€1.2bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Belgium; what its firms kept of it, €41m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Belgium's companies made less profit in Russia: €98m (0.02% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €89m (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €1.1bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €594m to €1.4bn; 0.18% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €1.9bn (0.33% of one year's GDP). Belgium kept more from shipping Russian oil: €51m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €21m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €20m to €67m); €68m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 13 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 12 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 11 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
44 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 11 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 7% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 71% modelled (C) and 21% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Belgium's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €5.8bn, 0.97% of one year's GDP (likely 0.75% to 1.4%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Belgium trade with Russia?
It bought €2.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€6.5bn in 2021), and sold €2.2bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €3.7bn (0.62% of GDP) less than without the war.
Does Belgium help Russia get around sanctions?
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €21m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €20m to €67m); €68m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Is Belgium helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +3.4% of one year's GDP (likely 2.2% to 4.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3.7bn (0.62% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Belgium still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 49.7% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €2.6bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €6.5bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
How much Russian money is frozen in Belgium?
Russian money frozen: 1.8% of a year's GDP (€10.8bn; likely €7.9bn to €12.1bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only. Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €185bn (December 2025, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €10bn (February 2025, source); €55bn of Russian investors' securities blocked through the sanctioned depository NSD, counted apart (February 2025). Euroclear reports €202bn of sanctioned Russian assets on its balance sheet (June 2026); that figure overlaps the central bank's and is not added to it.
War Balance