Is Montenegro helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine
Montenegro's support for Ukraine since 2022: €24m (0.34% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.37% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 2.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 91%).
likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 2.0% toward Ukraine · €25m · ≈ 0.08%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.37% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Most of what Russia kept less was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself.
Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.34%
€24m
likely 0.04% to 1.1% very likely · 97%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.02%
€2m
likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €2m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.13% of GDP more (€9m; likely from 0.58% toward Russia to 1.1% toward Ukraine)
Montenegro's own gain from trade with Russia: Montenegro kept 0.16% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€11m; likely <0.01% to 0.71% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Cut through sanctions it adopted Of the €34m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 63% was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 37% went beyond them.
Hosts many refugees 12,191 refugees from Ukraine, 20 per 1,000 residents.
Rough data: mostly estimates 51% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What decides this number
Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 83% larger, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.34% · €24m
Hosting refugeesD
+0.24%
€16m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.17%
€12m
Montenegro kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−0.08%
€5m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.03%
€2m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.02% · €2m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.44%
€30m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.33%
€22m
Montenegro kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.16%
€11m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.02%
€1m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€1m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€8m.
It bought €10m from Russia in 2021 and €8m in 2025. It sold €2m to Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. For Montenegro: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 63% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 37% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. Montenegro is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists Montenegro as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Montenegro. Checked 27 October 2026.
12,191 refugees from Ukraine, 20 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €16m (0.24% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Montenegro: €18m spent on refugees, less €2m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€44m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Montenegro; what its firms kept of it, €6m, is taken off its support.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €30m (0.44% of one year's GDP).
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
25 sources back its parts: 8 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 12% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 37% modelled (C) and 52% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 83% larger, the direction would flip.
How many Ukrainian refugees does Montenegro host, and what does it cost?
12,191 refugees from Ukraine, 20 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €16m (0.24% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Montenegro: €18m spent on refugees, less €2m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Is Montenegro helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.37% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 2.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 91%). Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
How much has Montenegro given to Ukraine?
Montenegro's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €24m, 0.34% of one year's GDP (likely 0.04% to 1.1%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Did Montenegro cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 63% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 37% beyond what sanctions required.
How does Montenegro compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Croatia +1.5%, Kosovo +1.1%, Bosnia and Herzegovina +0.56%, Montenegro +0.37%, Albania +0.07%, Serbia −1.4%.
War Balance