How much has Lithuania given to Ukraine since 2022?
Lithuania's support for Ukraine since 2022: €1.3bn (1.8% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €7.4bn (10.1% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €76m of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 11.9% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 6.8% to 18.2% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 11.9% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
1.8%
€1.3bn
likely 1.1% to 2.6% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
10.1%
€7.4bn
likely 5.0% to 16.3% toward Ukraine very likely · >99%
Russia kept €7.4bn (10.1% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 9.7% of GDP less (€7.1bn; likely 4.7% to 15.8% toward Ukraine)
Lithuania's own gain from trade with Russia: Lithuania kept 0.35% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€256m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.85% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% of GDP in returns (€76m).
Its story in short
Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €7.0bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 23% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 77% went beyond them.
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €109m (0.15% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Bought 92% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €3.0bn in 2021, €230m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 86% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €788m in 2021, €109m in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Top-10 aid giver for its size Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €1.2bn (1.7% of GDP), number 3 of 162 economies for its size.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 1.8% · €1.3bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+1.3%
€985m
Its share of EU aidB
+0.25%
€183m
Private donationsD
+0.11%
€80m
Hosting refugeesC
+0.06%
€43m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.04%
€29m
Lithuania kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC
−0.01%
€10m
Lithuania kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€4m
Lithuania kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C
−<0.01%
€2m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€2m
Lithuania kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 10.1% · €7.4bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+9.1%
€6.7bn
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.33%
€240m
Russian owners kept less from their firms hereC
+0.17%
€125m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.15%
€109m
Lithuania kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.13%
€97m
Its firms paid Russia less taxD
+0.13%
€93m
Lithuania's companies made less profit in RussiaD
+0.11%
€80m
Lithuania kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.11%
€79m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.09%
€69m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% in returns · €76m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.07%
€49m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.04%
€27m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€2.1bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €0.26bn in 2022 to €0.31bn in 2025.
It bought €3bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.23bn in 2025 (−92%). It sold €0.79bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.11bn in 2025 (−86%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 73.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Lithuania: €109m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 75% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Lithuania's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.67bn
€0.30bnrange €0.20bn to €0.39bn
€0.77bn
A
Oil products
€0.36bn
€0.31bnrange €0.26bn to €0.35bn
€0.19bn
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€0.19bn
€0.16bnrange €0.14bn to €0.18bn
not tracked
A
LNG
€79m
€68mrange €59m to €77m
€52m
C (estimate)
Coal
€43m
€37mrange €32m to €42m
€82m
A
Other goods
€2bn
€2bn
–
All goods
€3.3bn
€2.8bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: B, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 23% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 77% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Lithuania applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Lithuania as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Lithuania. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €2.3bn extra from 2022 (3.1% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €44m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.10% of a year's GDP (€76m; likely €55m to €90m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €0.10bn (August 2023, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
51,585 refugees from Ukraine, 18 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €43m (0.06% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Lithuania: €220m spent on refugees, less €177m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €1.5bn; counted here: €985m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €0.27bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.12bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.47bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €120m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.16bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Lithuania; what its firms kept of it, €17m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russian owners kept less from their firms here: €0.12bn (0.17% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €93m (0.13% of one year's GDP). Lithuania's companies made less profit in Russia: €80m (0.11% of one year's GDP). Russia took €152m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €46m to €479m; 0.21% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.24bn (0.33% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €20m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €19m to €68m); €94m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 1 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 1 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 1 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
43 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 2% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 92% modelled (C) and 6% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Lithuania's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €1.3bn, 1.8% of one year's GDP (likely 1.1% to 2.6%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Lithuania trade with Russia?
It bought €0.23bn from Russia in 2025 (€3bn in 2021), and sold €0.11bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €7.4bn (10.1% of GDP) less than without the war.
Is Lithuania helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +11.9% of one year's GDP (likely 6.8% to 18.2% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €7.4bn (10.1% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Lithuania–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €0.23bn from Russia in 2025 (€3bn in 2021), and sold €0.11bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €1.3bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +11.9% of one year's GDP (likely 6.8% to 18.2% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Lithuania still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 73.4% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.23bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €3bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Did Lithuania cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 23% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 77% beyond what sanctions required.
War Balance