Sweden's support for Ukraine since 2022: €8.8bn (1.6% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €10.6bn (1.9% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €0.71bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 3.7% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 2.9% to 4.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 3.7% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
1.6%
€8.8bn
likely 1.2% to 2.4% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
1.9%
€10.6bn
likely 1.3% to 2.6% toward Ukraine very likely · >99%
Russia kept €10.6bn (1.9% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.5% of GDP less (€8.0bn; likely 0.90% to 2.2% toward Ukraine)
Sweden's own gain from trade with Russia: Sweden kept 0.48% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€2.6bn; likely 0.18% to 0.61% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€712m).
Its story in short
Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €4.0bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 87% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 13% went beyond them.
Bought 100% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.7bn in 2021, €2m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Top-10 aid giver for its size Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €8.4bn (1.5% of GDP), number 5 of 162 economies for its size.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€712m; likely €513m to €835m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 1.6% · €8.8bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+1.2%
€6.6bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.31%
€1.7bn
Hosting refugeesD
+0.15%
€822m
Sweden kept part of others' aid, spent hereB
−0.06%
€301m
Sweden kept back part of its aid, spent at homeB
−0.02%
€126m
Private donationsD
+0.02%
€113m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€26m
Sweden kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)B
−<0.01%
€14m
Sweden kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€7m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€5m
Sweden kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€2m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.9% · €10.6bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.71%
€3.9bn
Sweden's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.46%
€2.5bn
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.44%
€2.4bn
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.33%
€1.8bn
Sweden kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.02%
€134m
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereC
−0.01%
€80m
Sweden earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€46m
Sweden kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€30m
Sweden kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€23m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€2m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €712m
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.08%
€458m
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.05%
€253m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€4.6bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €1.2bn in 2022 to €2.4bn in 2025.
It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025 (−100%). It sold €2.2bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.6bn in 2025 (−30%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 72.7% of what it bought from Russia. For Sweden: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Sweden's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.20bn
€0.11bnrange €77m to €0.15bn
€0.17bn
A
Oil products
€0.23bn
€0.21bnrange €0.15bn to €0.28bn
€0.21bn
B
LNG
€77m
€71mrange €52m to €0.10bn
€0.12bn
B
Coal
€18m
€17mrange €12m to €23m
€4m
A
Other goods
€0.34bn
€0.29bn
–
All goods
€0.86bn
€0.70bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: B, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 87% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 13% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, Sweden applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Sweden as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Sweden. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.87bn extra from 2022 (0.16% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€712m; likely €513m to €835m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €43m (September 2024, source (search summary, to be checked against the official text)).
Refugees from Ukraine
50,980 refugees from Ukraine, 4.8 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.82bn (0.15% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Sweden: €912m spent on refugees, less €90m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €11.3bn; counted here: €6.6bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €2.8bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €1.1bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €11bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €2.3bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€6.8bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Sweden; what its firms kept of it, €0.45bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Sweden's companies made less profit in Russia: €2.5bn (0.46% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €2.4bn (0.44% of one year's GDP). Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €80m (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €897m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €312m to €2.8bn; 0.16% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €1.8bn (0.33% of one year's GDP). Sweden kept more from shipping Russian oil: €23m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €30m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €29m to €100m); €167m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 9 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 8 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 8 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
45 sources back its parts: 15 official statistics, 11 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 10% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 76% modelled (C) and 14% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
Sweden's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €8.8bn, 1.6% of one year's GDP (likely 1.2% to 2.4%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Is Sweden helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +3.7% of one year's GDP (likely 2.9% to 4.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €10.6bn (1.9% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Sweden–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €2m from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €1.6bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €8.8bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +3.7% of one year's GDP (likely 2.9% to 4.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Did Sweden cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 87% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 13% beyond what sanctions required.
How much did Sweden give Ukraine each year?
Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €1.2bn; 2023 €1.5bn; 2024 €1.6bn; 2025 €2.4bn; 2026 (to August) €2.1bn. In total since 2022: €8.8bn (likely 1.2% to 2.4%).
Why does War Balance differ from the Kiel tracker for Sweden?
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €11.3bn; counted here: €6.6bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026.
War Balance