France's support for Ukraine since 2022: €16.9bn (0.60% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €20.2bn (0.72% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €6.5bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 1.6% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.80% to 2.3% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.6% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to.
Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.60%
€16.9bn
likely 0.46% to 0.88% very likely · >99%
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.72%
€20.2bn
likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 94%
Russia kept €20.2bn (0.72% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.67% of GDP less (€18.7bn; likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine)
France's own gain from trade with Russia: France kept 0.05% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€1.5bn; likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.23% of GDP in returns (€6.5bn).
Its story in short
Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €19.7bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 96% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 4% went beyond them.
Bought 65% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €11.4bn in 2021, €4.0bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 57% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €6.8bn in 2021, €2.9bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Major aid giver Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €15.3bn (0.55% of GDP), number 14 of 162 economies for its size.
Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.23% of a year's GDP (€6.5bn; likely €4.5bn to €7.7bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.60% · €16.9bn
Its share of EU aidB
+0.35%
€9.8bn
Aid: weapons, money, loansC
+0.15%
€4.3bn
Hosting refugeesC
+0.06%
€1.8bn
Undisclosed military aidC
+0.04%
€1.0bn
Private donationsC
+<0.01%
€135m
France kept part of others' aid, spent hereD
−<0.01%
€128m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€114m
France kept back part of its aid, spent at homeD
−<0.01%
€109m
France kept back part of its refugee spendingC
−<0.01%
€20m
France kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D
−<0.01%
€15m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€14m
France kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€5m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.72% · €20.2bn
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.69%
€19.5bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.08%
€2.3bn
Its firms paid Russia less taxC
+0.07%
€2.1bn
France's companies made less profit in RussiaC
+0.06%
€1.7bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.02%
€653m
France earned more from Russian oil and gas stakesB
−<0.01%
€254m
France kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€160m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€122m
France earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−<0.01%
€80m
France kept less from shipping Russian oilD
+<0.01%
€8m
Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.23% in returns · €6.5bn
Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC
+0.18%
€5.0bn
Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD
+0.05%
€1.5bn
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€12.4bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €3.5bn in 2022 to €3.2bn in 2025.
It bought €11.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €4bn in 2025 (−65%). It sold €6.8bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.9bn in 2025 (−57%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 85.3% of what it bought from Russia. For France: €2.3bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 83% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
France's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€1.6bn
€0.92bnrange €0.67bn to €1.2bn
€1.1bn
A
Oil products
€6.5bn
€4.7bnrange €3.5bn to €6.2bn
€6.9bn
A
Pipeline gas
€8.4bn
€6bnrange €4.3bn to €7.8bn
€0.39bn
A
LNG
€16.7bn
€14.3bnrange €11.1bn to €19.4bn
€16.4bn
A
Coal
€0.32bn
€0.23bnrange €0.17bn to €0.29bn
€0.21bn
A
Other goods
€5.9bn
€5.9bn
–
All goods
€39.5bn
€32bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 96% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 4% beyond what sanctions required.
Sanctions on Russia
Yes. As an EU member, France applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. Separately, Russia lists France as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by France. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €5bn extra from 2022 (0.18% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.33bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Russian money frozen
Russian money frozen: 0.23% of a year's GDP (€6.5bn; likely €4.5bn to €7.7bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €22.8bn (20 March 2022, source); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €1bn (6 May 2026, source).
Refugees from Ukraine
45,525 refugees from Ukraine, 0.7 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €1.8bn (0.06% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For France: €1.8bn spent on refugees, less €26m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €7.9bn; counted here: €4.3bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €15.1bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €6.5bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €19.9bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €3.0bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).
Money flowing back from the war effort
€7.3bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in France; what its firms kept of it, €0.28bn, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Its firms paid Russia less tax: €2.1bn (0.07% of one year's GDP). France's companies made less profit in Russia: €1.7bn (0.06% of one year's GDP). France earned more from Russian oil and gas stakes: €0.25bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €7.6bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €4.6bn to €15.0bn; 0.27% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.65bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). France kept less from shipping Russian oil: €8m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €58m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €55m to €190m); €258m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 20 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 17 of 21 members toward Ukraine. G7: number 4 of 7 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 17 of 23 members toward Ukraine.
45 sources back its parts: 15 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 20% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 75% modelled (C) and 5% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
It bought €4bn from Russia in 2025 (€11.4bn in 2021), and sold €2.9bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €20.2bn (0.72% of GDP) less than without the war.
How much has France given to Ukraine?
France's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €16.9bn, 0.60% of one year's GDP (likely 0.46% to 0.88%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does France still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 85.3% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €4bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €11.4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
France–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €4bn from Russia in 2025 (€11.4bn in 2021), and sold €2.9bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €16.9bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +1.6% of one year's GDP (likely 0.80% to 2.3% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Is France helping Russia?
In money terms the net is +1.6% of one year's GDP (likely 0.80% to 2.3% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €20.2bn (0.72% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Did France cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?
Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 96% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 4% beyond what sanctions required.
War Balance