Does Türkiye support Russia? What the money flows show
Türkiye's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.16bn (0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €32.8bn (3.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€20.5bn of €32.8bn). The net is 3.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia; very likely · 96%).
likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia · €32.7bn · ≈ 0.66%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 3.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on gas contracts, largest in 2022).
Chance toward Russia: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
0.02%
€160m
likely from 0.07% below zero to 0.07% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
3.1%
€32.8bn
likely 0.20% to 5.2% toward Russia very likely · 96%
Russia kept €32.8bn (3.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€20.5bn of €32.8bn).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.9% of GDP more (€31.1bn; likely 0.05% to 5.0% toward Russia)
Türkiye's own gain from trade with Russia: Türkiye kept 0.16% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1.7bn; likely 0.06% to 0.37% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €20.5bn (1.9% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €5.5bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €1.4bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €145m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with 0.02% · €160m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+0.01%
€156m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+<0.01%
€54m
Türkiye kept more from extra sales to UkraineC
−<0.01%
€28m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€27m
Türkiye kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereD
−<0.01%
€26m
Türkiye kept part of others' aid, spent hereD
−<0.01%
€14m
Türkiye kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D
−<0.01%
€13m
Hosting refugeesD
+<0.01%
€6m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 3.1% · €32.8bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−1.9%
€20.5bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−1.0%
€11.1bn
Türkiye earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsC
−0.10%
€1.0bn
Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansB
+0.06%
€611m
Türkiye's companies made more profit in RussiaC
−0.03%
€300m
Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
+0.02%
€163m
Its firms paid Russia more taxC
−0.02%
€162m
Türkiye kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−0.01%
€140m
Türkiye kept more from shipping Russian oilC
−0.01%
€108m
Türkiye kept more from settling Russia's tradeD
−<0.01%
€92m
Türkiye kept more from selling to RussiaD
−<0.01%
€89m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€40m
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−<0.01%
€21m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereC
+<0.01%
€13m
Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD
−<0.01%
€5m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€15bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.11bn in 2022 to €8m in 2025.
It bought €22.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €31.6bn in 2025 (+41%). It sold €4.8bn to Russia in 2021 and €6.1bn in 2025 (+27%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 54.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Türkiye: €20.5bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 91% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Türkiye's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€33.8bn
€20.8bnrange €13.4bn to €28.6bn
€25.8bn
C (estimate; customs do not name the supplier)
Oil products
€44.5bn
€32.5bnrange €23.8bn to €42.4bn
€60.7bn
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€48bn
€43.9bnrange €29bn to €59.9bn
€38.2bn
C (estimate; customs do not name the supplier)
LNG
€0m
€0m
€1.2bn
–
Coal
€13.4bn
€12.2bnrange €9.2bn to €15.6bn
€14.2bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
€58.4bn
€58.7bn
–
All goods
€198bn
€168bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
No. Türkiye has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (1 March 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Türkiye. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €4.1bn extra from 2022 (0.38% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €5.5bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Refugees from Ukraine
2,645 refugees from Ukraine, 0.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €6m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Türkiye: €6m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Why this differs from the Kiel tracker
Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €70m; counted here: €54m — donated weapons at their market value.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€5.1bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Türkiye; what its firms kept of it, €82m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Türkiye's companies made more profit in Russia: €0.30bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia more tax: €0.16bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russia took €551m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €138m to €1.8bn; 0.05% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.16bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Türkiye kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.11bn (0.01% of one year's GDP). Türkiye kept more from settling Russia's trade: €92m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €5m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €501m to €2.0bn); €31m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 7 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. NATO members: number 2 of 2 members toward Russia. Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion: number 3 of 4 members toward Russia.
51 sources back its parts: 18 official statistics, 14 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 2% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 97% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent
In money terms the net is −3.1% of one year's GDP (likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia; very likely · 96%). Chance toward Russia: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €32.8bn (3.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€20.5bn of €32.8bn). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Türkiye trade with Russia?
It bought €31.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€22.4bn in 2021), and sold €6.1bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €32.8bn (3.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€20.5bn of €32.8bn).
Türkiye–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €31.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€22.4bn in 2021), and sold €6.1bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.16bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −3.1% of one year's GDP (likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia; very likely · 96%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Türkiye help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €501m to €2.0bn); €31m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Does Türkiye still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 54.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €31.6bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €22.4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
How much has Türkiye given to Ukraine?
Türkiye's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.16bn, 0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.07% below zero to 0.07% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.
Does Türkiye have sanctions on Russia?
No. Türkiye has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (1 March 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Türkiye. Sources: Turkish Foreign Minister, 1 March 2022 (news report) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
War Balance