Does China support Russia? What the money flows show
China's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€0.52bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). China moved €128bn (0.74% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and China kept more from selling to Russia). The net is 0.75% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia · €128bn · ≈ 0.16%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.75% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€521m
likely from 0.02% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.74%
€128bn
likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia very likely · >99%
China moved €128bn (0.74% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and China kept more from selling to Russia).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.60% of GDP more (€103bn; likely 0.18% to 0.93% toward Russia)
China's own gain from trade with Russia: China kept 0.15% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€25.3bn; likely 0.07% to 0.30% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €18.1bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 75% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €60.7bn in 2021, €106bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 67% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €57.4bn in 2021, €95.6bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €23.5bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €23.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €15.5bn. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
Armed Russia: €1.3bn delivered Weapons, ammunition, drones or troops delivered to Russia: €1.3bn at full value. In the totals: €39m, because what Russia paid for counts at the seller's own gain, like any sale.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €521m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€574m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€89m
China kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D
−<0.01%
€20m
China kept part of others' aid, spent hereD
−<0.01%
€20m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+<0.01%
€2m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.74% · €128bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.48%
€82.5bn
China earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsC
−0.10%
€18.0bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.09%
€15.4bn
China's companies made more profit in RussiaC
−0.02%
€4.0bn
Its firms paid Russia more taxC
−0.02%
€3.7bn
China kept more from selling to RussiaC
−0.01%
€2.4bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€650m
Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD
−<0.01%
€480m
China earned more from Russian oil and gas stakesC
−<0.01%
€422m
China kept more from shipping Russian oilC
−<0.01%
€206m
China kept more from settling Russia's tradeD
−<0.01%
€182m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereC
+<0.01%
€177m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€45m
Weapons and troops sent to RussiaD
−<0.01%
€39m
China kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€27m
Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansD
+<0.01%
€17m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€34.8bn.
It bought €60.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €106bn in 2025 (+75%). It sold €57.4bn to Russia in 2021 and €95.6bn in 2025 (+67%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 67.0% of what it bought from Russia. For China: €15.4bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 46% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
China's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€257bn
€217bnrange €183bn to €253bn
€236bn
C (estimate)
Oil products
€29.6bn
€28.3bnrange €24.1bn to €32.8bn
€28.6bn
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€31.9bn
€30.8bnrange €26bn to €35.9bn
€31.3bn
C (estimate)
LNG
€23.3bn
€22.5bnrange €19.3bn to €25.9bn
€20bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€44.7bn
€43.1bnrange €36.4bn to €50bn
€37.1bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
€151bn
€174bn
–
All goods
€538bn
€515bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: B, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
No. China has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (9 March 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name China. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €18.1bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€2.3bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in China; what its firms kept of it, €39m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
China's companies made more profit in Russia: €4bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia more tax: €3.7bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). China earned more from Russian oil and gas stakes: €0.42bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €741m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €399m to €1.4bn; <0.01% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.65bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €0.48bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). China kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.21bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). China kept more from settling Russia's trade: €0.18bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €23.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €18.6bn to €31.8bn); €3.3bn in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals. Dual-use goods (machine tools, electronics, components) in recorded exports to Russia, 2022–2026: €23.2bn. They are counted in the sales to Russia above, not again as military support.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 17 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 2 of 6 members toward Russia.
42 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 11 research reports, 2 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
In money terms the net is −0.75% of one year's GDP (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. China moved €128bn (0.74% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and China kept more from selling to Russia). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. Weapons and troops it sent to Russia (about €1.3bn at full value) are listed on Russia's panel; in the totals they count at the seller's gain. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
China–Russia trade: how much since 2022?
It bought €106bn from Russia in 2025 (€60.7bn in 2021), and sold €95.6bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: China moved €128bn (0.74% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and China kept more from selling to Russia).
China–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €106bn from Russia in 2025 (€60.7bn in 2021), and sold €95.6bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.52bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.75% of one year's GDP (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does China still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 67.0% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €106bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €60.7bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
How does China compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Laos +0.14%, Kazakhstan +0.02%, Vietnam −0.03%, Myanmar −0.05%, Macao −0.06%, Pakistan −0.07%, Tajikistan −0.40%, China −0.75%, Afghanistan −1.5%, Hong Kong −1.6%, India −2.2%, Bhutan −2.5%, Nepal −2.5%, Mongolia −6.4%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%, North Korea −19.9%. In the map's ranking: number 17 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
No. China has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (9 March 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name China. Sources: Chinese MFA spokesperson, 9 March 2022 (news report) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
War Balance