Is Hong Kong helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia
Hong Kong's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€11m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €5.7bn (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 1.6% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%).
likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine · €5.8bn · ≈ 0.35%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 1.6% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly gold).
Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€11m
likely from 0.02% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
1.6%
€5.7bn
likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 97%
Russia kept €5.7bn (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.5% of GDP more (€5.4bn; likely from 3.5% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine)
Hong Kong's own gain from trade with Russia: Hong Kong kept 0.10% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€349m; likely from 0.76% toward Russia to 0.04% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Bought 377% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.1bn in 2021, €5.4bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 65% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €4.2bn in 2021, €1.5bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €7.5bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €7.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €5.8bn. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €5.0bn of the net's €5.8bn.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €11m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€11m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 1.6% · €5.7bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−1.4%
€5.0bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.11%
€406m
Hong Kong kept more from shipping Russian oilC
−0.05%
€195m
Hong Kong earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.05%
€169m
Hong Kong kept less from selling to RussiaC
+0.04%
€135m
Hong Kong kept more from settling Russia's tradeD
−0.03%
€98m
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC
+0.01%
€39m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−0.01%
€38m
Hong Kong's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−<0.01%
€27m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€9m
Hong Kong kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€6m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: −€1.6bn.
It bought €1.1bn from Russia in 2021 and €5.4bn in 2025 (+377%). It sold €4.2bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.5bn in 2025 (−65%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 8.9% of what it bought from Russia. For Hong Kong: €39m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Hong Kong's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€28m
€27mrange €8m to €48m
€0.16bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€0.15bn
€0.15bnrange €50m to €0.27bn
€90m
C (estimate)
Other goods
€44.8bn
€18.9bn
–
All goods
€44.9bn
€19.1bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
No. Hong Kong has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (11 October 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Hong Kong. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €41m extra from 2022 (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €29m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Gold transit hub: only the Russian gold that stays in Hong Kong counts here; the share passed on to mainland China is counted for China, and the share exported elsewhere for those buyers. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.41bn (0.11% of one year's GDP). Hong Kong kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.20bn (0.05% of one year's GDP). Hong Kong kept more from settling Russia's trade: €98m (0.03% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €7.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €2.7bn to €11.3bn); €1.2bn in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
29 sources back its parts: 8 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 88% modelled (C) and 12% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −1.6% of one year's GDP (likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%). Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €5.7bn (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Hong Kong trade with Russia?
It bought €5.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.1bn in 2021), and sold €1.5bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €5.7bn (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war.
Hong Kong–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €5.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.1bn in 2021), and sold €1.5bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €11m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −1.6% of one year's GDP (likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Hong Kong help Russia get around sanctions?
Gold transit hub: only the Russian gold that stays in Hong Kong counts here; the share passed on to mainland China is counted for China, and the share exported elsewhere for those buyers. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €7.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €2.7bn to €11.3bn); €1.2bn in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
How does Hong Kong compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: China −0.75%, Hong Kong −1.6%.
No. Hong Kong has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (11 October 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Hong Kong. Sources: Hong Kong Chief Executive, 11 October 2022 (AP report) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
Nearby in the ranking
Leaning toward Russia
Mozambique−0.85%Leaning toward Russia · −€165m · 68%
War Balance