Is Pakistan helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Pakistan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€66m (−0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €172m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.07% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.20% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.07% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.20% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine · €238m · ≈ 0.02%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.07% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 70%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.02%
€66m
likely from 0.08% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.05%
€172m
likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.17% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €172m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war.
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.05% of GDP more (€176m; likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.17% toward Ukraine)
- Pakistan's own gain from trade with Russia: Pakistan kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€5m; about 0)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 70%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.20% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.02% · €66m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.02% | €67m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €6m |
| Pakistan kept part of others' aid, spent hereD | −<0.01% | €5m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.05% · €172m
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.05% | €168m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC | −0.02% | €64m |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.02% | €52m |
| Pakistan kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €4m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.27bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −€19m | −€256m | −€275m | −0.08% |
| 2023 | −€7m | −€57m | −€64m | −0.10% |
| 2024 | −€6m | −€12m | −€19m | −0.11% |
| 2025 | −€22m | +€84m | +€62m | −0.09% |
| 2026* | −€12m | +€70m | +€58m | −0.07% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
Pakistan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €6mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €6m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€67m |
| Money flowing back | −€6msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€66m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €0.42bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.15bn in 2025 (−64%). It sold €0.15bn to Russia in 2021 and €60m in 2025 (−59%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 14.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Pakistan: €52m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026, 13% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Pakistan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil | €0.45bn | €0.27bnrange €0.20bn to €0.35bn | €0.53bn | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | <€1m | €0.29bnrange €0.19bn to €0.43bn | €75m | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €53m | €50mrange €38m to €69m | €24m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €2.1bn | €1.8bn | – | |
| All goods | €2.6bn | €2.4bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Pakistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Pakistan. Checked 27 October 2026.
The cost of switching away from Russian energy
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €61m extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €93m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.18bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Pakistan; what its firms kept of it, €6m, is taken off its support.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
Neighbours by land
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Pakistan | −0.07%−€0.24bnessentially zero |
| China | −0.75%−€128bnvery likely · >99% |
| Afghanistan | −1.5%−€0.24bnvery likely · 98% |
| India | −2.2%−€70.6bnvery likely · >99% |
How the number is backed
27 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 97% modelled (C) and 3% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- research Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)
- research Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)
Ukraine kept less from sales here C
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries C
- official Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics
- official Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Its share of IMF and World Bank loans C
Every source of its parts (27)
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- research Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)
- research Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- method input Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates
- method input Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)
- method input Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute
- own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates
- official Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics
- official Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
- research Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding
- official Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)
- method input Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)
- method input Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums
- official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition
- method input money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived
- research Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)
- research Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings
- method input Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports
Questions
Is Pakistan helping Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.07% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.20% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 70%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €172m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Pakistan–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €0.15bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.42bn in 2021), and sold €60m to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €66m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.07% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.20% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Pakistan trade with Russia?
It bought €0.15bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.42bn in 2021), and sold €60m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €172m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war.
Why is Pakistan's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: −0.07% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.20% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
How does Pakistan compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Pakistan −0.07%, China −0.75%, Afghanistan −1.5%, India −2.2%.
Where do the numbers for Pakistan come from?
27 sources back its parts, 5 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Ukraine kept less from sales here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Does Pakistan have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Pakistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Pakistan.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Macao−0.06%Essentially zero · −€24m · 73%
- Botswana−0.07%Essentially zero · −€12m · 83%
- Uruguay−0.07%Essentially zero · −€50m · 63%
- Pakistan−0.07%Essentially zero · −€238m · 70%
- Uganda−0.07%Essentially zero · −€33m · 59%
- Cambodia−0.08%Essentially zero · −€31m · 61%
- DR Congo−0.09%Essentially zero · −€63m · 64%
More about Pakistan
Its parts, ranked against other countries
- Cost of replacing Russian energy
- Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine
- Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here
- Sellers' gain on sales to Russia
- Weapons bought from Russia
Every country, by year
27 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/pakistan/