War Balance

China vs Türkiye: support for Ukraine and trade with Russia since 2022

China: Toward Russia by 0.75% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Türkiye: Toward Russia by 3.1% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia; very likely · 96%).

Support for Ukraine in euros: China €0.52bn, Türkiye €0.16bn. More in euros: Türkiye; more as a share of GDP: Türkiye.

China → Türkiye →

These numbers measure money: aid to Ukraine and the change in what Russia keeps from trade, against a world without the war. Weapons count at their money value: aid at market value when delivered, weapons and troops sent to Russia at the seller's gain where Russia paid and in full where it did not. Votes, diplomacy and intent are not in them.

Side by side

#CountryNetSupport for UkraineRussia kept from trade, vs no warPaid Russia since 2022
China−0.75%−€128bn · −€91 per personlikely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russiavery likely · >99%−€0.52bn<0.01% of GDPessentially zero€128bn more0.74% of GDP morevery likely · >99%€547bn3.2% of GDP
Türkiye−3.1%−€32.7bn · −€382 per personlikely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russiavery likely · 96%+€0.16bn+0.02% of GDPessentially zero€32.8bn more3.1% of GDP morevery likely · 96%€174bn16.3% of GDP

Each row: the best estimate, then its range and the chance of its direction, as in the country's panel.

What makes up each number

MeasureChinaTürkiye
Purchases from Ukraine vs no war−€0.57bn<0.01% of GDP+€0.16bn+0.01% of GDP
Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine+€89m<0.01% of GDP+€27m<0.01% of GDP
Aid spent here on energy, relief and rebuilding−€20m<0.01% of GDP−€13m<0.01% of GDP
Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here−€20m<0.01% of GDP−€14m<0.01% of GDP
Government aid to Ukraine+€2m<0.01% of GDP+€54m<0.01% of GDP
Extra sales to Ukraine–−€28m<0.01% of GDP
Arms Ukraine bought here–−€26m<0.01% of GDP
Cost of hosting refugees from Ukraine–+€6m<0.01% of GDP
Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold−€82.5bn−0.48% of GDP−€11.1bn−1.0% of GDP
Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions−€18bn−0.10% of GDP−€1bn−0.10% of GDP
Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices−€15.4bn−0.09% of GDP−€20.5bn−1.9% of GDP
Company profits in Russia−€4bn−0.02% of GDP−€0.30bn−0.03% of GDP
Company taxes paid in Russia−€3.7bn−0.02% of GDP−€0.16bn−0.02% of GDP
Sellers' gain on sales to Russia−€2.4bn−0.01% of GDP−€89m<0.01% of GDP
Russian oil bought via other countries−€0.65bn<0.01% of GDP+€0.16bn+0.02% of GDP
Gold and hidden payments to Russia−€0.48bn<0.01% of GDP−€5m<0.01% of GDP
Stakes in Russian oil and gas projects−€0.42bn<0.01% of GDP–
Shipping and insuring Russian oil−€0.21bn<0.01% of GDP−€0.11bn−0.01% of GDP
Payment agents settling Russia's trade−€0.18bn<0.01% of GDP−€92m<0.01% of GDP
Weapons bought from Russia+€0.18bn<0.01% of GDP+€13m<0.01% of GDP
Services bought from Russia−€45m<0.01% of GDP−€40m<0.01% of GDP
Weapons and troops sent to Russia−€39m<0.01% of GDP–
Services sold to Russia+€27m<0.01% of GDP−€0.14bn−0.01% of GDP
Rosatom projects and Russian state loans+€17m<0.01% of GDP+€0.61bn+0.06% of GDP
Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad–−€21m<0.01% of GDP

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia

Year by year

YearCountrySupport for UkraineTrade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)Net
2022China−€161m−€20.8bn−€21.0bn
Türkiye+€112m−€15.1bn−€15.0bn
2023China−€20m−€29.2bn−€29.2bn
Türkiye+€29m−€5.2bn−€5.2bn
2024China−€59m−€34.7bn−€34.8bn
Türkiye+€1m−€6.2bn−€6.2bn
2025China−€184m−€22.5bn−€22.6bn
Türkiye+€8m−€4.3bn−€4.3bn
2026*China−€97m−€20.7bn−€20.8bn
Türkiye+€10m−€1.9bn−€1.9bn

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-turkiye/