War Balance
Laos' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €21m (0.14% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.14% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 89%).
Leaning toward Ukraine by
0.14% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Ukraine · 89%
likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine · €20m · ≈ 0.03%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.14% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
<€1m
likely from 0.01% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.14%
€21m
likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 90%
Russia kept €21m (0.14% of GDP) less than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.14% · €21m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.13% | €19m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.04% | €5m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €3m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€5m.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.02% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | +€5m | +€5m | +0.05% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | +€4m | +€4m | +0.08% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | +€4m | +€4m | +0.11% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | +€5m | +€5m | +0.14% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
It bought €20m from Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025 (−89%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. For Laos: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Laos' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Laos. Checked 27 October 2026.
€22m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Laos; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Laos | +0.14%+€20mlikely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| Thailand | +0.08%+€0.39bnessentially zero |
| Vietnam | −0.03%−€0.10bnessentially zero |
| Myanmar | −0.05%−€35messentially zero |
| Cambodia | −0.08%−€31messentially zero |
| China | −0.75%−€128bnvery likely · >99% |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Turkmenistan | +1.5%+€0.57bnlikely toward Ukraine · 83% |
| Brunei | +3.1%+€0.45bnlikely toward Ukraine · 85% |
13 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 71% modelled (C) and 29% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is +0.14% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 89%). Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €21m (0.14% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Laos +0.14%, Thailand +0.08%, Vietnam −0.03%, Myanmar −0.05%, Cambodia −0.08%, China −0.75%.
13 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept less from weapons sold here: Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Laos' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Laos.
Leaning toward Ukraine
13 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/laos/