Does Kazakhstan support Russia? The net is essentially zero
Kazakhstan's support for Ukraine since 2022: €20m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €35m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.02% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine · €55m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.02% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Russia: 60%; 10% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
€20m
likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by
0.01%
€35m
likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €35m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.34% of GDP less (€813m; likely from 2.1% toward Russia to 3.0% toward Ukraine)
Kazakhstan's own gain from trade with Russia: Kazakhstan kept 0.32% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€778m; likely from 1.6% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €1.2bn (0.50% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €1.0bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.0bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €247m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
Russian-owned firms here Russian owners kept €687m (0.28% of GDP) more from their firms here.
Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 60%; 10% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €20m
Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC
+<0.01%
€14m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€4m
Kazakhstan kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€2m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+<0.01%
€2m
Hosting refugeesD
+<0.01%
€2m
Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.01% · €35m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+1.1%
€2.6bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.50%
€1.2bn
Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD
−0.28%
€687m
Kazakhstan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.26%
€636m
Kazakhstan kept more from settling Russia's tradeD
−0.06%
€137m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.05%
€124m
Kazakhstan's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−0.02%
€38m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.01%
€35m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−0.01%
€32m
Kazakhstan kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€19m
Kazakhstan kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€14m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+<0.01%
€13m
Kazakhstan kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.36bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €13.9bn from Russia in 2021 and €15.9bn in 2025 (+15%). It sold €5.7bn to Russia in 2021 and €5.7bn in 2025 (−1%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 9.7% of what it bought from Russia. For Kazakhstan: €1.2bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. Remittances from Russia changed by 0% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: €0 in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€145m to +€159m); migrants sent €383m home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Kazakhstan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€11m
€10mrange €9m to €12m
€1m
A
Oil products
€4.7bn
€4.4bnrange €4.1bn to €4.8bn
€1m
A
Pipeline gas
€2.1bn
€2bnrange €1.8bn to €2.2bn
not tracked
A
Coal
€0.39bn
€0.36bnrange €0.34bn to €0.40bn
not tracked
A
Other goods
€69.3bn
€64.7bn
–
All goods
€76.6bn
€71.5bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
No. Kazakhstan has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2022–2023). It has also said it will not let its territory be used to get around other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kazakhstan. Checked 27 October 2026.
4,240 refugees from Ukraine, 0.2 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Kazakhstan: €2m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.69bn (0.28% of one year's GDP). Russia took €168m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €52m to €498m; 0.07% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Kazakhstan kept more from settling Russia's trade: €0.14bn (0.06% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €35m (0.01% of one year's GDP). Kazakhstan kept more from shipping Russian oil: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.0bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €921m to €2.1bn); €53m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
37 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 72% modelled (C) and 28% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Kazakhstan–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €15.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€13.9bn in 2021), and sold €5.7bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €20m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Kazakhstan support Russia?
In money terms the net is +0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 60%; 10% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €35m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Kazakhstan help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.0bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €921m to €2.1bn); €53m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Does Kazakhstan trade with Russia?
It bought €15.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€13.9bn in 2021), and sold €5.7bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €35m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war.
How much has Kazakhstan given to Ukraine?
Almost nothing that can be measured: €20m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
How does Kazakhstan compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Turkmenistan +1.5%, Kazakhstan +0.02%, China −0.75%, Uzbekistan −4.1%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%.
Does Kazakhstan have sanctions on Russia?
No. Kazakhstan has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2022–2023). It has also said it will not let its territory be used to get around other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kazakhstan. Sources: Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry / President Tokayev on sanctions (Interfax) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
War Balance