War Balance
Myanmar's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€4m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €31m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€76m; the other parts take €45m off it). The net is 0.05% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.05% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine · €35m · ≈ 0.01%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.05% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: 65%; 90% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€4m
likely from 0.03% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.05%
€31m
likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €31m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€76m; the other parts take €45m off it).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 65%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €4m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €4m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.05% · €31m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.12% | €76m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.04% | €25m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.04% | €24m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€20m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −€1m | +€6m | +€6m | +<0.01% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −€14m | −€15m | −0.01% |
| 2024 | −€1m | −€19m | −€20m | −0.05% |
| 2025 | −€1m | +€2m | +€1m | −0.04% |
| 2026* | −€1m | −€6m | −€7m | −0.05% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Myanmar's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€4m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€4m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €7m from Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. It sold €20m to Russia in 2021 and €11m in 2025 (−46%). For Myanmar: €4m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Myanmar's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Myanmar. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.39bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €76m (0.12% of one year's GDP).
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Laos | +0.14%+€20mlikely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| Thailand | +0.08%+€0.39bnessentially zero |
| Bangladesh | −0.01%−€61messentially zero |
| Myanmar | −0.05%−€35messentially zero |
| China | −0.75%−€128bnvery likely · >99% |
| India | −2.2%−€70.6bnvery likely · >99% |
17 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 25% modelled (C) and 75% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 65%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €31m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€76m; the other parts take €45m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Its net is essentially zero: −0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Laos +0.14%, Thailand +0.08%, Bangladesh −0.01%, Myanmar −0.05%, China −0.75%, India −2.2%.
17 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept less from weapons sold here: Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Myanmar's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Myanmar.
Essentially zero
17 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/myanmar/