War Balance
Côte d'Ivoire's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €522m (0.70% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.71% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.32% to 0.97% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
Toward Russia by
0.71% of a year's GDP since 2022
very likely · >99%
likely 0.32% to 0.97% toward Russia · €525m · ≈ 0.15%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.71% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€2m
likely from 0.04% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.70%
€522m
likely 0.32% to 0.97% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept €522m (0.70% of GDP) more than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €2m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €2m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.70% · €522m
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.53% | €395m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.23% | €172m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.07% | €50m |
| Côte d'Ivoire kept more from selling to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.17bn.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +<€1m | −€70m | −€70m | −0.09% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | −€172m | −€172m | −0.33% |
| 2024 | −€1m | −€148m | −€148m | −0.53% |
| 2025 | −€1m | −€98m | −€99m | −0.66% |
| 2026* | −€1m | −€35m | −€35m | −0.71% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Côte d'Ivoire's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€2m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€2m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €0.18bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.36bn in 2025 (+103%). It sold €12m to Russia in 2021 and €77m in 2025 (+541%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 6.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Côte d'Ivoire: €172m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Côte d'Ivoire's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €1.2bn | €1bnrange €0.82bn to €1.3bn | €1bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0m | €0m | €1m | – |
| Other goods | €0.62bn | €0.58bn | – | |
| All goods | €1.8bn | €1.6bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Côte d'Ivoire's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Côte d'Ivoire. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €19m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
In the map's ranking: number 18 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Liberia | +0.63%+€26mlikely toward Ukraine · 85% |
| Mali | +0.06%+€14messentially zero |
| Côte d'Ivoire | −0.71%−€0.52bnvery likely · >99% |
| Ghana | −0.92%−€0.68bnvery likely · 99% |
| Burkina Faso | −3.9%−€0.75bnlikely toward Russia · 92% |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Mauritius | −0.86%−€0.11bnvery likely · >99% |
| Ghana | −0.92%−€0.68bnvery likely · 99% |
| South Africa | −0.49%−€1.8bnvery likely · >99% |
| Iran | −0.44%−€1.9bnvery likely · >99% |
21 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 92% modelled (C) and 8% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −0.71% of one year's GDP (likely 0.32% to 0.97% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €522m (0.70% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €0.36bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.18bn in 2021), and sold €77m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €522m (0.70% of GDP) more than without the war.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Liberia +0.63%, Mali +0.06%, Côte d'Ivoire −0.71%, Ghana −0.92%, Burkina Faso −3.9%. In the map's ranking: number 18 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
21 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Côte d'Ivoire's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Côte d'Ivoire.
Toward Russia · number 18 of 32
21 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/cote-divoire/