Does India support Russia? What the money flows show
India's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€0.15bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €70.5bn (2.2% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 2.2% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia · €70.6bn · ≈ 0.46%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 2.2% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€146m
likely from 0.03% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
2.2%
€70.5bn
likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept €70.5bn (2.2% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.2% of GDP more (€71.1bn; likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia)
India's own gain from trade with Russia: India kept 0.02% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€629m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.06% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €24.1bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 527% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €6.8bn in 2021, €42.8bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 56% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €2.9bn in 2021, €4.5bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €1.4bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €247m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €146m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€183m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€39m
India kept part of others' aid, spent hereC
−<0.01%
€4m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+<0.01%
€3m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 2.2% · €70.5bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−2.5%
€82.2bn
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC
+0.34%
€11.0bn
India earned less from Russian oil and gas stakesC
+0.04%
€1.2bn
India earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsC
−0.01%
€342m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereC
+<0.01%
€193m
Its firms paid Russia more taxC
−<0.01%
€130m
India's companies made more profit in RussiaC
−<0.01%
€121m
Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansD
+<0.01%
€107m
Russia kept more from services sold hereC
−<0.01%
€65m
India kept more from shipping Russian oilC
−<0.01%
€53m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€52m
India kept more from selling to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€41m
India kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€25m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€19.5bn.
It bought €6.8bn from Russia in 2021 and €42.8bn in 2025 (+527%). It sold €2.9bn to Russia in 2021 and €4.5bn in 2025 (+56%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 42.6% of what it bought from Russia. For India: €11.0bn paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
India's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€195bn
€121bnrange €83.3bn to €157bn
€150bn
A
Oil products
€16.8bn
€15.1bnrange €10.6bn to €19.4bn
€19bn
A
LNG
€0.35bn
€0.32bnrange €0.22bn to €0.42bn
€0.49bn
A
Coal
€18.7bn
€17.3bnrange €12.2bn to €22.2bn
€17.4bn
A
Other goods
€34.4bn
€39.8bn
–
All goods
€265bn
€194bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
No. India has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (July 2025). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name India. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €73m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €24.1bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Money flowing back from the war effort
€0.13bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in India; what its firms kept of it, €4m, is taken off its support.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
India earned less from Russian oil and gas stakes: €1.2bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia more tax: €0.13bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). India's companies made more profit in Russia: €0.12bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. India kept more from shipping Russian oil: €53m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €52m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €996m to €2.4bn); €53m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 10 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 1 of 6 members toward Russia.
37 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
It bought €42.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€6.8bn in 2021), and sold €4.5bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €70.5bn (2.2% of GDP) more than without the war.
Does India support Russia?
In money terms the net is −2.2% of one year's GDP (likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €70.5bn (2.2% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
India–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €42.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€6.8bn in 2021), and sold €4.5bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.15bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −2.2% of one year's GDP (likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does India still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 42.6% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €42.8bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €6.8bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Does India help Russia get around sanctions?
Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €996m to €2.4bn); €53m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
How does India compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bangladesh −0.01%, Myanmar −0.05%, Pakistan −0.07%, China −0.75%, India −2.2%, Bhutan −2.5%, Nepal −2.5%. In the map's ranking: number 10 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
How much Russian oil does India buy?
India's customs recorded these imports of crude oil from Russia (CIF, by country of origin): 2022 €24.2bn; 2023 €45bn; 2024 €48.7bn; 2025 €40.2bn; 2026, January to August €37bn. CREA's tracker, from ship data, estimates €31.9bn for 2025. On the map's basis (the Russian border price, with Russian crude in fuel it sold on counted for the buyers of that fuel) its crude comes to €121bn for 2022 to August 2026.
Does India have sanctions on Russia?
No. India has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (July 2025). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name India. Sources: Indian MEA spokesperson on the EU's 18th package, July 2025 (news report) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
War Balance