War Balance

China vs South Korea: support for Ukraine and trade with Russia since 2022

China: Toward Russia by 0.75% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). South Korea: Toward Ukraine by 1.1% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely 0.34% to 2.0% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%).

Support for Ukraine in euros: China €0.52bn, South Korea €0.88bn. More in euros: South Korea; more as a share of GDP: South Korea.

China → South Korea →

These numbers measure money: aid to Ukraine and the change in what Russia keeps from trade, against a world without the war. Weapons count at their money value: aid at market value when delivered, weapons and troops sent to Russia at the seller's gain where Russia paid and in full where it did not. Votes, diplomacy and intent are not in them.

Side by side

#CountryNetSupport for UkraineRussia kept from trade, vs no warRussian money frozen (return lost)Paid Russia since 2022
China−0.75%−€128bn · −€91 per personlikely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russiavery likely · >99%−€0.52bn<0.01% of GDPessentially zero€128bn more0.74% of GDP morevery likely · >99%–€547bn3.2% of GDP
South Korea+1.1%+€18.1bn · +€349 per personlikely 0.34% to 2.0% toward Ukrainevery likely · 99%+€0.88bn+0.05% of GDPvery likely · >99%€17.2bn less1.0% of GDP lessvery likely · 99%€18m<0.01% of GDP€43.4bn2.5% of GDP

Each row: the best estimate, then its range and the chance of its direction, as in the country's panel.

What makes up each number

MeasureChinaSouth Korea
Purchases from Ukraine vs no war−€0.57bn<0.01% of GDP+€43m<0.01% of GDP
Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine+€89m<0.01% of GDP+€29m<0.01% of GDP
Aid spent here on energy, relief and rebuilding−€20m<0.01% of GDP–
Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here−€20m<0.01% of GDP−€56m<0.01% of GDP
Government aid to Ukraine+€2m<0.01% of GDP+€0.51bn+0.03% of GDP
Private donations to Ukraine–+€0.35bn+0.02% of GDP
Cost of hosting refugees from Ukraine–+€1m<0.01% of GDP
Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold−€82.5bn−0.48% of GDP+€17.8bn+1.0% of GDP
Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions−€18bn−0.10% of GDP−€0.42bn−0.02% of GDP
Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices−€15.4bn−0.09% of GDP−€3.3bn−0.19% of GDP
Company profits in Russia−€4bn−0.02% of GDP+€1.4bn+0.08% of GDP
Company taxes paid in Russia−€3.7bn−0.02% of GDP+€2.1bn+0.12% of GDP
Sellers' gain on sales to Russia−€2.4bn−0.01% of GDP–
Russian oil bought via other countries−€0.65bn<0.01% of GDP−€0.28bn−0.02% of GDP
Gold and hidden payments to Russia−€0.48bn<0.01% of GDP–
Stakes in Russian oil and gas projects−€0.42bn<0.01% of GDP–
Shipping and insuring Russian oil−€0.21bn<0.01% of GDP−€0.12bn<0.01% of GDP
Payment agents settling Russia's trade−€0.18bn<0.01% of GDP–
Weapons bought from Russia+€0.18bn<0.01% of GDP–
Services bought from Russia−€45m<0.01% of GDP+€8m<0.01% of GDP
Weapons and troops sent to Russia−€39m<0.01% of GDP–
Services sold to Russia+€27m<0.01% of GDP+€7m<0.01% of GDP
Rosatom projects and Russian state loans+€17m<0.01% of GDP–
Frozen Russian central bank reserves–€18m<0.01% of GDP

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia

Year by year

YearCountrySupport for UkraineTrade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)Russian money frozenNet
2022China−€161m−€20.8bn€0−€21.0bn
South Korea+€369m+€2.1bn+€2m+€2.5bn
2023China−€20m−€29.2bn€0−€29.2bn
South Korea+€202m+€4.3bn+€5m+€4.5bn
2024China−€59m−€34.7bn€0−€34.8bn
South Korea+€218m+€4.0bn+€5m+€4.2bn
2025China−€184m−€22.5bn€0−€22.6bn
South Korea+€62m+€3.3bn+€4m+€3.3bn
2026*China−€97m−€20.7bn€0−€20.8bn
South Korea+€26m+€3.6bn+€2m+€3.6bn

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-south-korea/