War Balance
Is Vietnam helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero
Vietnam's support for Ukraine since 2022: €27m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €130m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€670m; the other parts take €540m off it). The net is 0.03% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.31% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).
Toward Russia by
0.03% of a year's GDP since 2022
essentially zero
likely from 0.31% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine · €103m · ≈ <0.01%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.03% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time fuel prices).
Chance toward Russia: 66%; 91% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
€27m
likely from 0.01% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.03%
€130m
likely from 0.31% toward Russia to 0.22% toward Ukraine essentially zero
Russia kept €130m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€670m; the other parts take €540m off it).
- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.04% of GDP more (€181m; likely from 0.29% toward Russia to 0.19% toward Ukraine)
- Vietnam's own gain from trade with Russia: Vietnam kept 0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€51m; likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 66%; 91% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.31% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €27m
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €24m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €3m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.03% · €130m
| Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansB | +0.17% | €706m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.16% | €670m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.07% | €275m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.07% | €270m |
| Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD | −0.06% | €238m |
| Vietnam kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €39m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €26m |
| Vietnam kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €22m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €10m |
| Vietnam's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Vietnam kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€39m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −€1m | −€29m | −€30m | −<0.01% |
| 2023 | +€2m | −€34m | −€32m | −0.01% |
| 2024 | +€5m | −€13m | −€8m | −0.02% |
| 2025 | +€10m | +€30m | +€39m | −<0.01% |
| 2026* | +€12m | −€84m | −€72m | −0.03% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Support for Ukraine by type
Vietnam's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €3mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €3m |
| Private donations and purchases | €24m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €27m |
Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €1.8bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.1bn in 2025 (+15%). It sold €2.8bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.8bn in 2025 (+0%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 29.6% of what it bought from Russia. For Vietnam: €670m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Vietnam's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €0.28bn | €0.23bnrange €0.16bn to €0.33bn | €0.16bn | C (estimate) |
| LNG | €32m | €30mrange €20m to €44m | €32m | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €3.9bn | €3.4bnrange €2.4bn to €4.8bn | €3bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €5.8bn | €5.4bn | – | |
| All goods | €10bn | €9.1bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of Vietnam's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Vietnam. Checked 27 October 2026.
The cost of switching away from Russian energy
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €72m extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €31m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.24bn (0.06% of one year's GDP).
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.27bn (0.07% of one year's GDP). Vietnam kept more from shipping Russian oil: €2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €140m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €101m to €282m); €313m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
Neighbours by land
How the number is backed
32 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 31% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 45% modelled (C) and 24% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
Sources, by part
Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans B
Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- official Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025
- research Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D
Russian owners kept more from their firms here D
Every source of its parts (32)
- official Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting
- method input Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat
- own estimate War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)
- research Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports
- method input Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates
- official UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine
- official Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025
- method input Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened
- method input Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)
- method input Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia
- research Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)
- research Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)
- method input net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results
- method input refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins
- own estimate Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it
- research Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments
- official Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade
- official GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition
- method input Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports
- method input Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)
- method input Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums
- method input money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived
- research Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)
- method input Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)
- method input Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute
- own estimate Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates
- official Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia
- research Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings
- method input Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports
- official Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports
- research Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding
- research Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations
Questions
Is Vietnam helping Russia?
In money terms the net is −0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.31% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 66%; 91% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €130m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€670m; the other parts take €540m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Vietnam–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €2.1bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.8bn in 2021), and sold €2.8bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €27m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.31% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does Vietnam trade with Russia?
It bought €2.1bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.8bn in 2021), and sold €2.8bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €130m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€670m; the other parts take €540m off it).
How much has Vietnam given to Ukraine?
Almost nothing that can be measured: €27m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
Why is Vietnam's net so small?
Its net is essentially zero: −0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.31% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
How does Vietnam compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Laos +0.14%, Vietnam −0.03%, Cambodia −0.08%, China −0.75%.
Does Vietnam have sanctions on Russia?
We found no sanctions of Vietnam's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Vietnam.
Nearby in the ranking
Essentially zero
- Bahrain−0.02%Essentially zero · −€8m · 53%
- Cayman Islands−0.02%Essentially zero · −€2m · 56%
- Malawi−0.02%Essentially zero · −€3m · 50%
- Vietnam−0.03%Essentially zero · −€103m · 66%
- Curaçao−0.03%Essentially zero · −€1m · 59%
- Australia−0.04%Essentially zero · −€607m · 76%
- Zimbabwe−0.05%Essentially zero · −€17m · 55%
More about Vietnam
Its parts, ranked against other countries
- Rosatom projects and Russian state loans
- Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices
- Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad
- Cost of replacing Russian energy
- Sellers' gain on sales to Russia
- Weapons bought from Russia
- Purchases from Ukraine vs no war
- Services sold to Russia
- Company taxes paid in Russia
- Company profits in Russia
- Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine
Every country, by year
32 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/vietnam/