Is Kyrgyzstan helping Russia? What the money flows show
Kyrgyzstan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Kyrgyzstan moved €1.4bn (10.0% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to Russia). The net is 10.0% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.77% to 18.7% toward Russia; very likely · 97%).
likely 0.77% to 18.7% toward Russia · €1.4bn · ≈ 2.1%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 10.0% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€1m
likely from 0.25% below zero to 0.03% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
10.0%
€1.4bn
likely 0.76% to 18.7% toward Russia very likely · 97%
Kyrgyzstan moved €1.4bn (10.0% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to Russia).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 8.9% of GDP more (€1.3bn; likely from 16.9% toward Russia to 0.22% toward Ukraine)
Kyrgyzstan's own gain from trade with Russia: Kyrgyzstan kept 1.1% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€158m; likely 0.35% to 3.7% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €675m (4.8% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €220m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 90% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.5bn in 2021, €2.9bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia 216% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €277m in 2021, €875m in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €77m It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €9m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €1m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 10.0% · €1.4bn
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−4.8%
€675m
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−3.7%
€529m
Kyrgyzstan kept more from settling Russia's tradeC
−0.63%
€89m
Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD
−0.50%
€71m
Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to RussiaC
−0.35%
€50m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.23%
€33m
Kyrgyzstan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.12%
€17m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.09%
€13m
Kyrgyzstan kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−0.02%
€2m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.47bn.
It bought €1.5bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.9bn in 2025 (+90%). It sold €0.28bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.87bn in 2025 (+216%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 40.6% of what it bought from Russia. For Kyrgyzstan: €675m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by +2.4% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: +€336m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€2.0bn to +€2.3bn); migrants sent €11.5bn home from Russia in that time. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Kyrgyzstan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€3.5bn
€3.2bnrange €2.7bn to €3.9bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Pipeline gas
€0.29bn
€0.27bnrange €0.22bn to €0.32bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Other goods
€6.1bn
€7.8bn
–
All goods
€9.8bn
€11.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Kyrgyzstan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kyrgyzstan. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €21m extra from 2022 (0.15% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.22bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Kyrgyzstan kept more from settling Russia's trade: €89m (0.63% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €71m (0.50% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €13m (0.09% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €69m to €161m); €2m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 1 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. Central Asia: number 1 of 2 members toward Russia. Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion: number 1 of 4 members toward Russia.
28 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 93% modelled (C) and 7% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −10.0% of one year's GDP (likely 0.77% to 18.7% toward Russia; very likely · 97%). Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Kyrgyzstan moved €1.4bn (10.0% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to Russia). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Kyrgyzstan help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €69m to €161m); €2m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Does Kyrgyzstan trade with Russia?
It bought €2.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.5bn in 2021), and sold €0.87bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Kyrgyzstan moved €1.4bn (10.0% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to Russia).
How does Kyrgyzstan compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Kazakhstan +0.02%, Tajikistan −0.40%, China −0.75%, Uzbekistan −4.1%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%. In the map's ranking: number 1 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Kyrgyzstan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kyrgyzstan.
War Balance