Is North Korea helping Russia? Party to the war (with Russia)
Its troops fought for Russia against Ukraine in the Kursk region from late 2024, which it confirmed in April 2025, and it supplied Russia with shells and missiles. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked. Its money numbers since 2022 come to 19.9% of one year's GDP, toward Russia (likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia).
likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia · €5.9bn · ≈ 4.3%/yr
Raised Russia's earnings from trade = 19.9% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.
Party to the war (with Russia), not ranked. Its troops fought for Russia against Ukraine in the Kursk region from late 2024, which it confirmed in April 2025, and it supplied Russia with shells and missiles. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked.
Support for Ukraine
No support for Ukraine recorded:
0%
€0
about 0
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
19.9%
€5.9bn
likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia
North Korea moved €5.9bn (19.9% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (North Korea kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€5.9bn of €5.9bn)).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.07% of GDP more (€21m; likely from 0.58% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine)
North Korea's own gain from trade with Russia: North Korea kept 19.8% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€5.9bn; likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Party to the war Its troops fought for Russia against Ukraine in the Kursk region from late 2024, which it confirmed in April 2025, and it supplied Russia with shells and missiles. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked.
Armed Russia: €10.0bn delivered Weapons, ammunition, drones or troops delivered to Russia: €10.0bn at full value. In the totals: €5.9bn, because what Russia paid for counts at the seller's own gain, like any sale.
Mostly one part Weapons and troops sent to Russia: €5.9bn of the net's €5.9bn.
What makes up the number
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 19.9% · €5.9bn
Weapons and troops sent to RussiaC
−19.8%
€5.9bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereD
−0.06%
€18m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−<0.01%
€3m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€2m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−<0.01%
€2m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2025: −€2.3bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Trade with Russia before and after
It bought €7m from Russia in 2021 and €40m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €10m in 2025. For North Korea: €2m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2026, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Sanctions on Russia
We found no sanctions of North Korea's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name North Korea. Checked 27 October 2026.
18 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 4 research reports, 2 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D). No data: Purchases from Ukraine. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (20%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
North Korea soldiers and shells for Russia: what are they worth?
North Korea soldiers and shells, with other military supplies sent to Russia since 2022: about €10bn at full value, from the sources on Russia's panel. In the totals, what Russia paid for counts at the seller's net gain, like a sale; what it did not pay for counts in full. As a party to the war, it is listed apart and not ranked.
Is North Korea helping Russia?
Its troops fought for Russia against Ukraine in the Kursk region from late 2024, which it confirmed in April 2025, and it supplied Russia with shells and missiles. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked. In money terms the net is −19.9% of one year's GDP (likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia). North Korea moved €5.9bn (19.9% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (North Korea kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€5.9bn of €5.9bn)). Weapons and troops it sent to Russia (about €10bn at full value) are listed on Russia's panel; in the totals they count at the seller's gain. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
We found no sanctions of North Korea's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name North Korea.
Nearby in the ranking
Party to the war (with Russia), not ranked. Ranking
War Balance