Is Malaysia helping Russia? What the money flows show
Malaysia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €3m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2.5bn (0.65% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.64% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.19% to 1.2% toward Russia; very likely · 99%).
likely 0.19% to 1.2% toward Russia · €2.5bn · ≈ 0.14%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.64% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (largest part: more fuel bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
€3m
likely from 0.01% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.65%
€2.5bn
likely 0.19% to 1.2% toward Russia very likely · 99%
Russia kept €2.5bn (0.65% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.63% of GDP more (€2.4bn; likely 0.17% to 1.2% toward Russia)
Malaysia's own gain from trade with Russia: Malaysia kept 0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€52m; likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €486m (0.13% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €433m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €610m It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €610m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €485m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €3m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€10m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€8m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.65% · €2.5bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.32%
€1.2bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.19%
€729m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−0.13%
€486m
Malaysia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD
−0.02%
€59m
Malaysia kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€16m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€8m
Malaysia kept more from services sold to RussiaC
−<0.01%
€6m
Malaysia kept more from shipping Russian oilD
−<0.01%
€2m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+<0.01%
€2m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.72bn.
It bought €0.94bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.4bn in 2025 (+48%). It sold €0.79bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.69bn in 2025 (−12%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 72.0% of what it bought from Russia. For Malaysia: €486m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Malaysia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€0.23bn
€0.20bnrange €0.16bn to €0.26bn
€0.12bn
A
Oil products
€3.7bn
€3.5bnrange €2.8bn to €4.5bn
€6.3bn
A
Coal
€2.1bn
€1.9bnrange €1.5bn to €2.4bn
€2.7bn
A
Other goods
€2.1bn
€2.6bn
–
All goods
€8.1bn
€8.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Malaysia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Malaysia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.22bn extra from 2022 (0.06% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.43bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.73bn (0.19% of one year's GDP). Malaysia kept more from shipping Russian oil: €2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €610m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €454m to €1.1bn); €104m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
In the map's ranking: number 19 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
29 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 69% modelled (C) and 31% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −0.64% of one year's GDP (likely 0.19% to 1.2% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2.5bn (0.65% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Malaysia trade with Russia?
It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.94bn in 2021), and sold €0.69bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €2.5bn (0.65% of GDP) more than without the war.
Does Malaysia still buy Russian oil and gas?
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 72.0% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.4bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €0.94bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
How much has Malaysia given to Ukraine?
Almost nothing that can be measured: €3m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
How does Malaysia compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Brunei +3.1%, Thailand +0.08%, Indonesia −0.20%, Malaysia −0.64%. In the map's ranking: number 19 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
We found no sanctions of Malaysia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Malaysia.
War Balance