War Balance

China vs North Korea: support for Ukraine and trade with Russia since 2022

China: Toward Russia by 0.75% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). North Korea: Toward Russia by 19.9% of a year's GDP since 2022 (likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia).

China → North Korea →

These numbers measure money: aid to Ukraine and the change in what Russia keeps from trade, against a world without the war. Weapons count at their money value: aid at market value when delivered, weapons and troops sent to Russia at the seller's gain where Russia paid and in full where it did not. Votes, diplomacy and intent are not in them.

Side by side

#CountryNetSupport for UkraineRussia kept from trade, vs no warPaid Russia since 2022
China−0.75%−€128bn · −€91 per personlikely 0.32% to 1.1% toward Russiavery likely · >99%−€0.52bn<0.01% of GDPessentially zero€128bn more0.74% of GDP morevery likely · >99%€547bn3.2% of GDP
North Korea−19.9%−€5.9bn · −€222 per personlikely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia–€5.9bn more19.9% of GDP more€6.2bn20.9% of GDP

Each row: the best estimate, then its range and the chance of its direction, as in the country's panel.

What makes up each number

MeasureChinaNorth Korea
Purchases from Ukraine vs no war−€0.57bn<0.01% of GDP–
Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine+€89m<0.01% of GDP–
Aid spent here on energy, relief and rebuilding−€20m<0.01% of GDP–
Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here−€20m<0.01% of GDP–
Government aid to Ukraine+€2m<0.01% of GDP–
Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold−€82.5bn−0.48% of GDP−€18m−0.06% of GDP
Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions−€18bn−0.10% of GDP–
Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices−€15.4bn−0.09% of GDP−€2m<0.01% of GDP
Company profits in Russia−€4bn−0.02% of GDP–
Company taxes paid in Russia−€3.7bn−0.02% of GDP–
Sellers' gain on sales to Russia−€2.4bn−0.01% of GDP–
Russian oil bought via other countries−€0.65bn<0.01% of GDP−€3m<0.01% of GDP
Gold and hidden payments to Russia−€0.48bn<0.01% of GDP–
Stakes in Russian oil and gas projects−€0.42bn<0.01% of GDP–
Shipping and insuring Russian oil−€0.21bn<0.01% of GDP–
Payment agents settling Russia's trade−€0.18bn<0.01% of GDP–
Weapons bought from Russia+€0.18bn<0.01% of GDP–
Services bought from Russia−€45m<0.01% of GDP+€2m<0.01% of GDP
Weapons and troops sent to Russia−€39m<0.01% of GDP−€5.9bn−19.8% of GDP
Services sold to Russia+€27m<0.01% of GDP–
Rosatom projects and Russian state loans+€17m<0.01% of GDP–

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia

Year by year

YearCountrySupport for UkraineTrade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−)Net
2022China−€161m−€20.8bn−€21.0bn
North Korea€0+€3m+€3m
2023China−€20m−€29.2bn−€29.2bn
North Korea€0−€821m−€821m
2024China−€59m−€34.7bn−€34.8bn
North Korea€0−€2.3bn−€2.3bn
2025China−€184m−€22.5bn−€22.6bn
North Korea€0−€2.3bn−€2.3bn
2026*China−€97m−€20.7bn−€20.8bn
North Korea€0−€478m−€478m

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-north-korea/