War Balance
Mongolia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.2bn (6.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€785m of €1.2bn). The net is 6.4% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 10.7% toward Russia to 7.8% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 77%).
Leaning toward Russia by
6.4% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Russia · 77%
likely from 10.7% toward Russia to 7.8% toward Ukraine · €1.2bn · ≈ 1.4%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 6.4% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time fuel prices).
Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.01%
€2m
likely from 0.11% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
6.4%
€1.2bn
likely from 10.7% toward Russia to 7.8% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 77%
Russia kept €1.2bn (6.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€785m of €1.2bn).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €2m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.01% | €2m |
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 6.4% · €1.2bn
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −4.1% | €785m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −2.3% | €436m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.03% | €5m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Mongolia kept less from selling to RussiaD | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Mongolia kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.34bn.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | −€281m | −€281m | −1.5% |
| 2023 | −<€1m | −€336m | −€336m | −3.2% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | −€197m | −€197m | −4.3% |
| 2025 | −€1m | −€78m | −€79m | −4.7% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | −€319m | −€320m | −6.4% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Mongolia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€2m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€2m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €1.5bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.1bn in 2025 (+34%). It sold €94m to Russia in 2021 and €76m in 2025 (−19%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 60.1% of what it bought from Russia. For Mongolia: €785m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 8% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Mongolia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil products | €7.1bn | €6.2bnrange €5.1bn to €7.3bn | not tracked | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €5.1bn | €4.4bn | – | |
| All goods | €12.2bn | €10.7bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Mongolia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mongolia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.34bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| China | −0.75%−€128bnvery likely · >99% |
| Mongolia | −6.4%−€1.2bnlikely toward Russia · 77% |
24 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −6.4% of one year's GDP (likely from 10.7% toward Russia to 7.8% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 77%). Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.2bn (6.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€785m of €1.2bn). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €2.1bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.5bn in 2021), and sold €76m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.2bn (6.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€785m of €1.2bn).
In money terms: it bought €2.1bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.5bn in 2021), and sold €76m to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €2m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −6.4% of one year's GDP (likely from 10.7% toward Russia to 7.8% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 77%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 60.1% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €2.1bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €1.5bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: China −0.75%, Mongolia −6.4%.
We found no sanctions of Mongolia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mongolia.
Leaning toward Russia
24 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/mongolia/