War Balance
Nepal's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€22m (−0.06% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €952m (2.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€961m; the other parts take €9m off it). The net is 2.5% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 1.6% to 3.6% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).
Toward Russia by
2.5% of a year's GDP since 2022
very likely · >99%
likely 1.6% to 3.6% toward Russia · €974m · ≈ 0.53%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 2.5% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).
Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.06%
€22m
likely <0.01% to 0.24% below zero very likely · 97%
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
2.4%
€952m
likely 1.5% to 3.5% toward Russia very likely · >99%
Russia kept €952m (2.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€961m; the other parts take €9m off it).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.06% · €22m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.06% | €22m |
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 2.4% · €952m
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC | −2.5% | €961m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.03% | €12m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €2m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.24bn.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −€2m | −€113m | −€115m | −0.30% |
| 2023 | −€3m | −€235m | −€238m | −0.91% |
| 2024 | −€5m | −€236m | −€241m | −1.5% |
| 2025 | −€8m | −€169m | −€177m | −2.0% |
| 2026* | −€3m | −€199m | −€202m | −2.5% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Nepal's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€22m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€22m |
Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €39m from Russia in 2021 and €12m in 2025 (−68%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. For Nepal: €2m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
We found no sanctions of Nepal's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Nepal. Checked 27 October 2026.
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.96bn (2.5% of one year's GDP).
In the map's ranking: number 8 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| China | −0.75%−€128bnvery likely · >99% |
| India | −2.2%−€70.6bnvery likely · >99% |
| Nepal | −2.5%−€0.97bnvery likely · >99% |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| India | −2.2%−€70.6bnvery likely · >99% |
| Afghanistan | −1.5%−€0.24bnvery likely · 98% |
| Uzbekistan | −4.1%−€4.1bnvery likely · >99% |
| Sri Lanka | −0.87%−€0.70bnvery likely · >99% |
15 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −2.5% of one year's GDP (likely 1.6% to 3.6% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €952m (2.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€961m; the other parts take €9m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: China −0.75%, India −2.2%, Nepal −2.5%. In the map's ranking: number 8 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.
15 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics; Ukraine kept less from sales here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
We found no sanctions of Nepal's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Nepal.
Toward Russia · number 8 of 32
15 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/