Is Tajikistan helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call
Tajikistan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €46m (0.39% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€137m; the other parts take €92m off it). The net is 0.40% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 58% toward Russia).
likely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine · €46m · ≈ 0.09%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.40% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on oil, largest in 2022).
Chance toward Russia: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
<0.01%
€1m
likely from 0.14% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.39%
€46m
likely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine too close to call · 58% toward Russia
Russia kept €46m (0.39% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€137m; the other parts take €92m off it).
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.38% of GDP more (€44m; likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine)
Tajikistan's own gain from trade with Russia: Tajikistan kept 0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; likely from 1.0% toward Russia to 0.15% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
War-time fuel prices Russia kept €137m (1.2% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €49m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
Bought 93% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €982m in 2021, €1.9bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €77m It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €0. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
Mostly one part Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: €137m of the net's €46m.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 34% smaller, the direction would flip.
What makes up the number
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €1m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€1m
Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.39% · €46m
Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC
−1.2%
€137m
Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC
+0.55%
€64m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+0.29%
€33m
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.03%
€3m
Tajikistan kept more from selling to RussiaD
−0.02%
€2m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−0.02%
€2m
Tajikistan kept less from services sold to RussiaC
+0.02%
€2m
Tajikistan's companies made more profit in RussiaD
−<0.01%
€1m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.19bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
It bought €0.98bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.9bn in 2025 (+93%). It sold €56m to Russia in 2021 and €95m in 2025 (+70%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 22.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Tajikistan: €137m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 7% of it on gas contracts. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by +80.7% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: +€9.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely +€4.7bn to +€15.2bn); migrants sent €20.9bn home from Russia in that time. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
Tajikistan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Oil products
€0.61bn
€0.56bnrange €0.48bn to €0.61bn
not tracked
C (estimate)
Other goods
€5.1bn
€6.8bn
–
All goods
€5.8bn
€7.3bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
We found no sanctions of Tajikistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tajikistan. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €43m extra from 2022 (0.37% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €49m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €3m (0.03% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €44m to €163m); €0 in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
27 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 97% modelled (C) and 3% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (97%) counts
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −0.40% of one year's GDP (likely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 58% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €46m (0.39% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€137m; the other parts take €92m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does Tajikistan trade with Russia?
It bought €1.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.98bn in 2021), and sold €95m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €46m (0.39% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€137m; the other parts take €92m off it).
What decides Tajikistan's number?
Chance toward Russia: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 34% smaller, the direction would flip.
Does Tajikistan help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €44m to €163m); €0 in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
How does Tajikistan compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Tajikistan −0.40%, China −0.75%, Afghanistan −1.5%, Uzbekistan −4.1%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%.
We found no sanctions of Tajikistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tajikistan.
War Balance