War Balance
Serbia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.1bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.0bn of €1.1bn). The net is 1.4% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 3.6% toward Russia to 1.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 84%).
Leaning toward Russia by
1.4% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Russia · 84%
likely from 3.6% toward Russia to 1.3% toward Ukraine · €1.1bn · ≈ 0.31%/yr
Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 1.4% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on gas contracts).
Chance toward Russia: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by
<0.01%
€2m
likely from 0.10% below zero to 0.04% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
1.4%
€1.1bn
likely from 3.6% toward Russia to 1.3% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 83%
Russia kept €1.1bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.0bn of €1.1bn).
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Russia: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by <0.01% · €2m
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.02% | €16m |
| Serbia kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereD | −0.02% | €12m |
| Serbia kept part of others' aid, spent hereD | −0.01% | €10m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €3m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €3m |
| Serbia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Serbia kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €1m |
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 1.4% · €1.1bn
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −1.4% | €1.0bn |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.32% | €234m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.12% | €87m |
| Russian owners kept more from their firms hereC | −0.11% | €84m |
| Serbia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.09% | €69m |
| Serbia kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −0.05% | €34m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.01% | €10m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.01% | €9m |
| Serbia's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €7m |
| Serbia kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Serbia kept less from selling to RussiaD | +<0.01% | €6m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.95bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +€1m | −€950m | −€949m | −1.3% |
| 2023 | −€2m | −€260m | −€262m | −1.6% |
| 2024 | −€4m | +€13m | +€9m | −1.6% |
| 2025 | +<€1m | +<€1m | +€1m | −1.6% |
| 2026* | +€2m | +€144m | +€145m | −1.4% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Serbia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Humanitarian aid | €3m |
| Refugee hosting | €3m |
| Private donations and purchases | €16m |
| Money flowing back | −€24msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€2m |
Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.2bn in 2025 (−13%). It sold €0.79bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.59bn in 2025 (−25%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.3% of what it bought from Russia. For Serbia: €1.0bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023, 85% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Serbia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil | €1bn | €0.91bnrange €0.69bn to €1.1bn | not tracked | A |
| Oil products | €97m | €92mrange €69m to €0.12bn | not tracked | A |
| Pipeline gas | €4.2bn | €4.1bnrange €2.9bn to €5.3bn | €5bn | A |
| Coal | €21m | €21mrange €15m to €26m | not tracked | A |
| Other goods | €2.6bn | €2.5bn | – | |
| All goods | €7.9bn | €7.6bn | – |
Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.
No. Serbia has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2025). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Serbia. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €33m extra from 2022 (0.04% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.
16,142 refugees from Ukraine, 2.5 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €3m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Serbia: €3m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.
€0.78bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Serbia; what its firms kept of it, €24m, is taken off its support.
Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €84m (0.11% of one year's GDP).
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €87m (0.12% of one year's GDP). Serbia kept more from settling Russia's trade: €7m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €37m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €30m to €68m); €12m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Bulgaria | +3.3%+€3.1bnlikely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| Romania | +2.8%+€8.9bnvery likely · 99% |
| Croatia | +1.5%+€1.2bnvery likely · >99% |
| Kosovo | +1.1%+€0.11bnlikely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | +0.56%+€0.14bnlikely toward Ukraine · 85% |
| Montenegro | +0.37%+€25mlikely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| Serbia | −1.4%−€1.1bnlikely toward Russia · 84% |
| North Macedonia | −2.1%−€0.30bnlikely toward Russia · 87% |
| Hungary | −6.0%−€11.4bnvery likely · 97% |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| North Macedonia | −2.1%−€0.30bnlikely toward Russia · 87% |
| Armenia | −0.17%−€37mlikely toward Russia · 69% |
| Georgia | −4.1%−€1.2bnlikely toward Russia · 87% |
39 sources back its parts: 14 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 86% modelled (C) and 14% rough indications (D).
In money terms the net is −1.4% of one year's GDP (likely from 3.6% toward Russia to 1.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 84%). Chance toward Russia: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.1bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.0bn of €1.1bn). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
It bought €1.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.4bn in 2021), and sold €0.59bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.1bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.0bn of €1.1bn).
Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.3% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.2bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €1.4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €37m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €30m to €68m); €12m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bulgaria +3.3%, Romania +2.8%, Croatia +1.5%, Kosovo +1.1%, Bosnia and Herzegovina +0.56%, Montenegro +0.37%, Serbia −1.4%, North Macedonia −2.1%, Hungary −6.0%.
39 sources back its parts, 14 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it. The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
No. Serbia has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2025). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Serbia. Sources: Serbia and EU alignment on Russia (news report) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
Leaning toward Russia
39 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
УкраїнськаDeutschFrançaisPolskiNederlandsEspañol
Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/