War Balance
Kosovo's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €107m (1.1% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 1.1% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 6.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 91%).
Leaning toward Ukraine by
1.1% of a year's GDP since 2022
likely toward Ukraine · 91%
likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 6.0% toward Ukraine · €106m · ≈ 0.23%/yr
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 1.1% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.
Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by
0.01%
€1m
likely from 0.34% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by
1.1%
€107m
likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 6.0% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 92%
Russia kept €107m (1.1% of GDP) less than without the war.
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 84% smaller, the direction would flip.
Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €1m
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.01% | €1m |
Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.1% · €107m
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +1.3% | €126m |
| Kosovo kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −0.16% | €16m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.03% | €3m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −0.01% | €1m |
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€28m.
| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | −<€1m | +€21m | +€20m | +0.21% |
| 2023 | +<€1m | +€28m | +€28m | +0.50% |
| 2024 | −<€1m | +€21m | +€21m | +0.72% |
| 2025 | −<€1m | +€15m | +€15m | +0.87% |
| 2026* | −<€1m | +€22m | +€21m | +1.1% |
Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. *2026: to August.
Kosovo's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.
| Military aid | – |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€1m |
Quality of the split: C No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.
It bought €48m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025 (−100%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. For Kosovo: €3m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
Yes. Kosovo is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Official EU reports say its alignment is incomplete. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kosovo. Checked 29 October 2026.
Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Kosovo | +1.1%+€0.11bnlikely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| Montenegro | +0.37%+€25mlikely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| Albania | +0.07%+€16messentially zero |
| Serbia | −1.4%−€1.1bnlikely toward Russia · 84% |
| North Macedonia | −2.1%−€0.30bnlikely toward Russia · 87% |
| Country | Net, % of GDP |
|---|---|
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | +0.56%+€0.14bnlikely toward Ukraine · 85% |
| Montenegro | +0.37%+€25mlikely toward Ukraine · 91% |
14 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).
Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 84% smaller, the direction would flip.
In money terms the net is +1.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 6.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 91%). Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €107m (1.1% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Kosovo +1.1%, Montenegro +0.37%, Albania +0.07%, Serbia −1.4%, North Macedonia −2.1%.
14 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine; Kosovo kept more from services sold to Russia: Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia; Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.
Yes. Kosovo is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Official EU reports say its alignment is incomplete. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kosovo. Sources: Exit News, 25 February 2022: Kosovo imposes sanctions on Russia over the invasion of Ukraine (asset freezes, travel bans, in line with the US and EU) (news report); Anadolu Agency, 16 May 2022: Kosovo expands its sanctions against Russia (and Belarus): asset freezes, travel bans, goods from both countries (news report).
Leaning toward Ukraine
14 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. Open in the map · How this is measured
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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/