Is the United Arab Emirates helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia
The United Arab Emirates' support for Ukraine since 2022: €48m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3.6bn (0.72% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.71% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%).
likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine · €3.5bn · ≈ 0.15%/yr
Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.71% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).
Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.
Support for Ukraine
Supported Ukraine with
<0.01%
€48m
likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.03% above zero essentially zero
Russia's earnings from trade
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by
0.72%
€3.6bn
likely from 2.0% toward Russia to 0.22% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 97%
Russia kept €3.6bn (0.72% of GDP) more than without the war.
Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.68% of GDP more (€3.4bn; likely from 1.8% toward Russia to 0.25% toward Ukraine)
The United Arab Emirates' own gain from trade with Russia: The United Arab Emirates kept 0.04% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€193m; likely from 0.45% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)
The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.
Its story in short
Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €1.8bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.8bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €299m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
What decides this number
Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.
What makes up the number
Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €48m
Aid: weapons, money, loansB
+0.01%
€62m
Ukraine kept less from sales hereC
−<0.01%
€15m
Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC
+<0.01%
€7m
The United Arab Emirates kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD
−<0.01%
€5m
Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.72% · €3.6bn
Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC
−0.47%
€2.3bn
Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate
−0.32%
€1.6bn
Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC
+0.12%
€589m
The United Arab Emirates kept more from settling Russia's tradeD
−0.03%
€134m
Its firms paid Russia more taxD
−0.01%
€62m
The United Arab Emirates' companies made more profit in RussiaD
−0.01%
€51m
Russia kept less from services sold hereC
+<0.01%
€18m
The United Arab Emirates kept more from shipping Russian oilC
−<0.01%
€15m
Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD
+<0.01%
€12m
The United Arab Emirates kept less from selling to RussiaC
+<0.01%
€7m
+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.
By year
The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€1.2bn.
It bought €3bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.9bn in 2025 (+29%). It sold €0.61bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.78bn in 2025 (+27%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 3.4% of what it bought from Russia. For the United Arab Emirates: €589m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.
What it bought from Russia, by fuel
The United Arab Emirates' purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.
Fuel
Customs (CIF)
Map basis (FOB)
Tracker (CREA)
Quality
Crude oil
€1.2bn
€0.78bnrange €41m to €2.3bn
€0.38bn
C (estimate)
Oil products
€5.4bn
€12bnrange €3bn to €25.5bn
€15.1bn
C (estimate)
Coal
€0.17bn
€0.16bnrange €49m to €0.34bn
€0.16bn
C (estimate)
Other goods
€24.8bn
€8.6bn
–
All goods
€31.6bn
€21.6bn
–
Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.
No. The United Arab Emirates has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2023). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the United Arab Emirates. Checked 27 October 2026.
Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.12bn extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.18bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.
Companies, Russia and Russian owners
Its firms paid Russia more tax: €62m (0.01% of one year's GDP). The United Arab Emirates' companies made more profit in Russia: €51m (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia took €185m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €100m to €339m; 0.04% of a year's GDP.
Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1.6bn (0.32% of one year's GDP). The United Arab Emirates kept more from settling Russia's trade: €0.13bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). The United Arab Emirates kept more from shipping Russian oil: €15m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.8bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €978m to €3.6bn); €64m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
Compared with its neighbours and groups
Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.
36 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 1% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 61% modelled (C) and 38% rough indications (D).
Data coverage
Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
In money terms the net is −0.71% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%). Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3.6bn (0.72% of GDP) more than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.
Does the United Arab Emirates trade with Russia?
It bought €3.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€3bn in 2021), and sold €0.78bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €3.6bn (0.72% of GDP) more than without the war.
United Arab Emirates–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?
In money terms: it bought €3.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€3bn in 2021), and sold €0.78bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €48m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.71% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.9% toward Russia to 0.23% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.
Does the United Arab Emirates help Russia get around sanctions?
Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.8bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €978m to €3.6bn); €64m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.
How much has the United Arab Emirates given to Ukraine?
Almost nothing that can be measured: €48m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).
How does the United Arab Emirates compare with its neighbours?
The net as a share of one year's GDP: Saudi Arabia −0.30%, United Arab Emirates −0.71%, Oman −1.4%.
Does the United Arab Emirates have sanctions on Russia?
No. The United Arab Emirates has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2023). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the United Arab Emirates. Sources: UAE official to Reuters, 2023 (news report) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).
Nearby in the ranking
Leaning toward Russia
Singapore−0.41%Leaning toward Russia · −€2.0bn · 75%
War Balance